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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of gender, political affiliation, and family
composition issues on reasonable compensation in closely held corporations. It is broken
down into two parts: an archival and behavioral (survey) portion. The archival part
analyzes decisions made in the U.S. Tax Court spanning 1983-2014 through the use of
simple regression, multiple regression/ordinary least squares, and logistic regression. Four
variables were found to be significant: judge gender, tenure, number of tax years decided,
and taxpayer gender. The behavioral portion investigates the current perceptions o f tax
practitioners through surveying Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).
variance is used in this portion.
affiliation.
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The significant variable from this part is political
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequent areas of tax confrontation, since 1918, for corporations is
the disallowance of compensation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (known today as the
Internal Revenue Service1) (Holzman 1971). What constitutes a reasonable salary has been
one of the most mistreated areas in the Internal Revenue Code reaching as far back as when
this issue was included in Code Section 23(a)(1)(A) (Griswold 1945). Additionally, it has
been described as one o f the most burdensome and abused clauses in the Internal Revenue
Code (Griswold 1945) and one of the most vexing issues accompanying the taxing of
closely held corporations (Englebrecht and Windlinger 1979). The term “reasonable” does
seem to indicate an objective standard. Although reasonable is easy to define, it does
represent a challenge when trying to apply it to a real life scenario. That is, objectivity may
or may not be present when closely held corporations are involved.

Also, the term

compensation not only includes wages but fringe benefits consisting of medical insurance,
death benefits, meals and entertainment, and pension and profit-sharing. Furthermore, the
parties that are affected on a recurring basis in this highly litigated arena are tax
professionals, management, and taxing authorities (Englebrecht and Windlinger 1979).
Therefore, many parties are affected by this far-reaching tax issue.

1 Internal Revenue Service will be referred to as IRS, Service, and Commissioner interchangeably
throughout this dissertation.

1

2
Reasonable Compensation Origins
Originally, Section 234(a) of the 1918 Revenue Act addressed reasonable
compensation. It provided, in calculating net income, a reasonable allowance for salaries
and other compensation for services personally rendered, as an ordinary and necessary
expense incurred or paid during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business.
Therefore, the original intention of Congress was to broaden the language within the
Internal Revenue Code allowing a deduction even when no salaries were paid.2 This
worked to counteract the effects of the excess profits tax implemented on October 3,1917
(Griswold 1945).

Because the original intentions provided for a broadening o f the

language in the Internal Revenue Code, a shareholder-employee benefits substantially
from receiving compensation as salary payments escaping double taxation. Naturally, an
objective of any intelligent shareholder would be to receive payments from a corporation
in the form of a salary resulting in being taxed only once (Englebrecht and Windlinger
1979).

The lack of clear-cut guidelines existing in the Internal Revenue Code and

Treasury Regulations has encouraged the litigation of compensation disallowed by the
Service over the years. As a result, the significant number of cases heard in court appears
to be a result o f inadequate guidance provided to corporations and taxpayers.

2 From the Griswold (1945) article footnote on page 287 which said “The basic part of this material
apparently first came to light in a brief filed by Marvin Haynes, Esq., of Washington D.C., in a case which
was thereafter settled so that no decision on the question was required.”
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Lucas and Gustafson
Two of the earliest cases deciding reasonable compensation were Lucas v. Ox
Fibre Brush Co., brought before the Supreme Court, and Gustafson Manufacturing Co.
The Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co. case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The details
surrounding this case involved two employees, the president and the treasurer. Each
employee received $24,000 in additional compensation. Additionally, each employee
devoted all of their time to the corporation and guaranteed considerable bank loans
personally. Furthermore, both employees guided the corporation’s general policies while
leading the charge for all large purchases. As a result, the compensation paid for prior
services, was deemed reasonable because of the substantial benefits the corporation
received from the two individuals. Therefore, if the corporation wants to reward the work
performed by the individuals, the corporation has every right to do so. In Gustafson
Manufacturing, the taxpayer was a close corporation organized under Tennessee state law.
The president and general manager was the majority stock owner. He received a $20,000
salary in 1918, and regularly and actively participated in management. Furthermore, he
devoted all of his time to the business of the corporation.
compensation allowing $16,000 in 1918.

The IRS challenged the

The court rendered a decision for the

Commissioner disallowing a deduction for compensation exceeding the amount allowed
by the Service.

Why the Scrutiny?
Typically, reasonable compensation is challenged because within these
corporations being contested, few people hold a majority of the stock while being
employed by the corporation in significant positions. This means these individuals usually

4
act in a decision-making role either as a senior officer or employee (Englebrecht and
Windlinger 1979). Moreover, in one specific instance, the judiciary’s ability to challenge
small businesses’ reasonable compensation could stem from the growth of entrepreneurial
companies throughout economic growth periods and the arrival of small and mid-sized
high-tech companies (Person 1995). Practitioners have even gone as far as to build a
roadmap when advising their clientele in dealing with reasonable compensation. This
guidance has provided for proper corporate documentation, avoidance of building profits
in order to make large payments, instituting a history of paying dividends, paying high
compensation to productive major principals, allowing for compensation-based benefit
programs, and ultimately, consideration of becoming a limited liability company or S
corporation (Person 1995). Further suggestions include researching what other companies
of comparable size in similar business lines pay their owners, examining how the company
matches up with companies in the same industry, keeping adequate records of
responsibilities o f owner-executives, explaining the reasons for accumulating profits, and
formally connecting compensation to company performance.

Also, the business or

corporation needs to make clear that their owner-executive (or person receiving the
compensation) is entitled to every penny paid by the business or corporation.3
Additionally, the corporation/taxpayer must take into consideration the burden of proving
that the amount paid is reasonable (Swift 1966). The determination deemed reasonable
by the Service is presumed to be correct leaving the task o f justifying the higher amounts
in the hands of the taxpayer (Hoffman 1979). In this regard, an arm’s length standard
must be present when determining the reasonableness of the compensation deduction.

3 Compensation & Benefits Report. May 2003. Vol. 17, Issue 5, pg. 10-11.
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One avenue taxpayers have explored, to combat the disallowance in the past, has been the
hiring of an expert witness to confirm or verify the reasonableness of the compensation
(Englebrecht and Windlinger 1979).

Quantifying the Impact
The impact of litigation can be far-reaching. According to Hoffman (1979), the
contested portion of compensation claimed by a corporation can cost the business up to
nearly 48% of the disallowed amount because unearned income could go as high as 70%
(Hoffman 1979). Furthermore, all businesses can potentially be affected by this tax issue
including sole proprietorships and partnerships.

Also, closely-held corporations and

publicly held corporations are both equally susceptible to scrutiny from the Service.

Tax Guidance
Code Section 162 provides that a reasonable allowance for compensation is
allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense deduction. An expense is deemed ordinary
if it is typically incurred in the type of activities that the business is operating within.
Moreover, would taxpayers operating in similar businesses incur the same type of
expense? A necessary expense is an expense which is helpful, appropriate, or able to
contribute to the taxpayer’s profit seeking activities. Also, a necessary expense does not
always qualify as an ordinary expense. If an expense is necessary but not ordinary, the
expense fails to be deductible.4 Ultimately, this deduction has the power to reduce a
company’s taxable income and thereby its tax liability. Regulation Sec. 1.162-7 (b)(1)

4 Deputy v. DuPont, 40-1 USTCf)161, 23 AFTR 808, 308 U.S. 488 (USSC, 1940) from CCH Federal
Taxation Comprehensive Topics 2015 Edition
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posits further guidance indicating compensation that exceeds the purchase price or value
of services rendered may be a distribution of a dividend. When the distribution is deemed
a dividend, the salary payment no longer becomes deductible. This leads to double
taxation, first, at the corporate level and then at the individual level.5 As a result, the
corporation’s taxable income is larger, and the corporation’s tax liability is increased. If
earnings are paid out as salary, the individual tax is the only tax that remains.6 Naturally,
the determination of reasonable compensation for corporations and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has significant tax consequences.

Example
The following example illustrates the reasonable compensation conundrum.
Example: Taxpayer A and B, wife and husband, each have a 50% ownership
interest in ABC Corporation. In 2015, ABC Corp. compensated each $150,000,
and had taxable income of $100,000 following the salary payments. Taxpayer A
and B file a joint return and claim no dependents. When audited, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) determined reasonable compensation to be $75,000 for
each individual. The excess ($150,000) was determined to be classified as a
dividend.

This reclassification causes a tax increase of $58,500 for ABC

Corporation, as illustrated in Examples 1 and 2.

5 Compensation & Benefits Report. May 2003. Vol. 17, Issue 5, pg. 10-11.
6 Compensation & Benefits Report. May 2003. Vol. 17, Issue 5, pg. 10-11.
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Example 1
Personal Income Tax Return - Taxpayer A and B
Adjusted Gross Income
Less:
Standard Deduction
Personal and Dependency Exemptions
Taxable Income
Tax
(279,400-230,450) X 0.33 = 16,153.5
51,577.50
Total Tax
ABC Corporation
Taxable Income
Tax
50,000X0.15 = 7,500
25.000 X 0.25 = 6,250
25.000 X 0.34 = 8,500
Total Tax
Example 2
Personal Income Tax Return - Taxpayer A and B
Reasonable Salaries Allowed
Dividend Income
Adjusted Gross Income
Less:
Standard Deduction
Personal and Dependency Exemptions
Taxable Income
Tax
(279,400-230,450) X 0.33 = 16,153.5
51,577.50
Total Tax
ABC Corporation
Taxable Income Claimed on Return
Add: Disallowed Compensation
Adjusted Gross Income
Tax
50,000X0.15 = 7,500
25.000 X 0.25 = 6,250
25.000 X 0.34 = 8,500
150,000X0.39 = 58,500
Total Tax

300,000
-12,600
-8,000
279.400

67.731

100.000

22.250

150,000
150,000
300,000
-12,600
-8,000
279.400

67.731
100,000
150.000
250.000

80.750

8

Summary
Difference in Tax Consequences

Original Calculation
Disallowance Included
Increase in Tax

Taxpayer A and B
67.731
67.731
Q

ABC Corporation Total Tax
22,250
89,981
80,750
148,481
58.500
58.500

Judicial History
The topic of reasonable compensation has generated numerous judicial decisions
over the last 60 years.

Nonetheless, four landmark cases have emerged over this

timeframe. These cases are Mayson Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner, 49-2 USTC f9467 (CA6,1949), Elliot’s Inc. v. Commissioner, 83-2 USTC f9610 (1983), Exacto Spring Corp. v.
Commissioner, 1999-2 USTC f 50,964 (CA -7,1999), and Miller and Sons Drywall Inc. v.
Commissioner, 89 TCM 1279, T.C. Memo. 2005-14 (2005).

Mayson Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner
In the Mayson Mfg. Co. case7, the company was organized in Michigan in the
middle of 1929.

Four shareholders held the initial 800 shares.

The issue under

examination in this case focused on the compensation of three individuals (May, Peterson,
and Hosier) of which two were initial shareholders. May was the president and general
manager from 1934-1943. Peterson was the vice president in charge of manufacturing
during that same time period and Hosier held the position of secretary, treasurer, and
salesman.

The factors (9 in all) used by the court to determine reasonableness of

''Mayson Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner, 49-2 USTC f9467 (CA-6, 1949)
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compensation included the 1) employee’s qualifications, 2) the nature, extent and scope
of the employee’s work, 3) the size and complexities of the business, 4) a comparison of
salaries paid with the gross income and the net income, 5) the prevailing general economic
conditions, 6) comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders, 7) the prevailing
rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns, 8) the salary
policy of the taxpayer as to all employees, and 9) the compensation paid to the specific
employee in prior years. Only one of these factors failed to provide evidence of support
for the reasonableness of paid compensation to Hosier, Peterson, and May. The decision
rendered, on appeal, was that the Tax Court’s position was clearly erroneous and should
be put aside.

Elliot’s Inc. v. Commissioner
In Elliot’s Inc.*, the petitioner was an Idaho corporation in the business of selling
John Deere manufactured equipment and John Deere services equipment. This corporation
was incorporated in 1952, and it started with eight individuals. Over the next 23 years, the
corporation had 40 employees. However, the issue of compensation revolved around the
corporation’s chief executive officer and sole shareholder. He was compensated through
a fixed salary and a bonus at year-end. The Service challenged the reasonableness under
Section 162(a)(1). Five broad categories were used to determine the reasonableness o f the
compensation. These categories consisted of 1) role in company, 2) external comparison,
3) character and condition of the company, 4) conflict of interest,

and 5) internal

consistency. On appeal, the court concluded that the failure to pay dividends and

6Elliot’s Inc. v. Commissioner, 83-2 USTC 1(9610 (1983)
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the employee’s role as sole shareholder does not cause the compensation payments to be
treated as disguised dividends. Furthermore, the case was reversed and remanded back to
the Tax Court.

Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner
In Exacto Spring Corp.9, the corporation was in the business of precision spring
manufacturing. This closely-held corporation compensated its principal owner, cofounder,
and chief executive (same individual) in the amounts of $1.3 million in 1993 and $1.0
million in 1994. The IRS allowed only $381,000 for 1993 and $400,000 for 1994. The
Tax Court ruled nearly halfway between the petitioner’s and the Service’s amounts
allowing $900,000 in 1993 and $700,000 in 1994. The appellate court considered seven
factors comprised of 1) the type and extent of the services rendered, 2) the scarcity of
qualified employees, 3) the qualifications and prior earning capacity of the employee, 4)
the contributions of the employee to the business venture, 5) the net earnings o f the
employer, 6) the prevailing compensation paid to employees with comparable jobs, and 7)
the peculiar characteristics of the employer’s business. After evaluating the factors, the
appellate court concluded the factors were neutral and ruled in favor of the taxpayer.
Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Tax Court and rendered a decision in favor
of the taxpayer.

9Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 1999-2 USTC f 50,964 (C A -7,1999)
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Miller and Sons Drywall Inc. v. Commissioner
In the Miller and Sons Drywall Inc}0 case, a father and son began operating in the
drywall construction business in the 1970s. The son then acquired the drywall construction
company prior to 1980 from his father operating it as a sole proprietorship in the beginning.
The business was then incorporated as a C corporation in the middle of 1980 and had three
shareholder-employees including a chief executive officer/president, a vice president, and
a secretary/treasurer. The factors (9 in total) considered by the court included 1) employee
qualifications, 2) nature, extent, and scope of the employee’s work, 3) the size and
complexity of the business, 4) prevailing general economic conditions, 5) the employee’s
compensation as a percentage of gross and net income, 6) the employer-shareholders’
compensation compared with distributions to shareholders, 7) the employee-shareholders’
compensation compared with that paid to non-shareholder-employees or paid in prior
years, 8) prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns, and 9) comparison of compensation paid to a particular shareholder-employee in
previous years where the corporation has a limited number of officers. The factors ruled
in favor of the three employees were factors one, two, three, four, and five. The factors
deemed neutral were seven and nine. Factors six and eight ruled in favor of the Service.
Ultimately, the Tax Court decided the compensation paid to the three shareholders was
reasonable and, thereby deductible in full for the years at issue.

10Miller and Sons Drywall Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 TCM 1279, T.C. Memo. 2005-114
(2005)
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Prior Compensation and Gender Research
With each major case, a shift in factors that judges use to render decisions has
been forthcoming. There have even been attempts to curtail the abuse by allowing
corporations to receive repayment of deemed excessive compensation from the
executive or other individuals when the IRS disallows part or all of the compensation as
reasonable (Holzman 1971). Prior studies have examined which factors the judges deem
most important in making their decisions. In the Englebrecht et al. (2014) article, the
authors found that through the use of logistic regression, four factors were very
significant in explaining the court’s rulings. Other studies have found different
significant factors (Boyd 1977; Price 1981; Porcano 1982; Carpenter 1984).
While reasonable compensation is an ever growing area o f litigation and research,
the effect of gender on decision-making, specifically in court, continues to intrigue and
challenge researchers in numerous fields of study. Accounting and taxation research is
no less immune to the effect of gender. The research done in the gender effect arena
pertaining to accounting and taxation has looked at valuation in estate tax cases, innocent
spouse relief, differences in ideology, differences in culture, hiring decisions, voting
patterns, ethical judgments, identifying a “just society”, ethical behaviors, decisions in
arbitration, and employee evaluation.
Decision making has also been a widely studied area. Theories that have surfaced
to predict decision making are: 1) identity, 2) law and partisanship, 3) strategy, and 4)
personal experiences and relationships (Glynn and Sen 2015).

Several studies have

scrutinized the makeup of judges in order to gain a better understanding of why judges
make the decisions that they do. These aspects of judges include gender, race, and even
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personal relationships. With the study of personal relationships, four theories are explored
to build a link between the judges and the decisions they make. These four theories include
preference realignment, lobbying, learning, and protectionism. Preference realignment and
lobbying relate to the idea that judges have differing beliefs from the beliefs of close family
members. Furthermore, they incur cost because they tend to be punished at home for their
social views (Glynn and Sen 2015). The theory of learning and exposure encompass the
idea that learning is affected by personal relationships. Additionally, empathy is created
as a result of educating one’s self about the worldview of others. Last, protectionism can
be described as wanting to avoid physical or emotional harm.

Objectives of this Study
The main objective of this study is to determine what factors outside of the facts
and circumstances of the case affect the decision made by a judge when faced with a
reasonable compensation issue. The archival portion of this study tries to achieve this
result by building a model using multiple and logistic regression comprised of variables
previously found significant in prior studies. Factors will be extracted from the summary
opinions offered by the Tax Court judges in reasonable compensation cases contested in
the U.S. Tax Court between 1983 and 2014. The behavioral portion of this study will use
survey vignettes to gauge the current views of professionals on the topics of reasonable
compensation and gender.

This study addresses the following research questions:
1) Is there a significant difference in how male and female judges render a
reasonable compensation decision?
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2) Do judges simply come to a “Compromise” decision, represented as the
arithmetic mean, when deciding a reasonable compensation decision?
3) Are male judges more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation for
the taxpayer than female judges?
4) Are judges more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge?
5) Are male taxpayers more likely to receive a compensation decision higher than
female taxpayers?
6) Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
of ruling in favor of the taxpayer than a judge appointed by a Democratic
president?
7) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer when the
taxpayer has at least one appraiser?
8) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS when the IRS
has at least one appraiser?
9) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer’s value
when multiple years are involved?
10) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS’ value when the
judge has at least one daughter?

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter One presents the
reasonable compensation topic.

Chapter Two explains the historical background of

reasonable compensation and reviews the literature associated with reasonable
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compensation, judicial forums, and gender differences.

Chapter Three discusses the

research methodology. Chapter Four analyzes the data and explains the results. Chapter
Five offers a summary, discussion of the results, limitations of the study, and areas for
future research.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
LITERATURE REVIEW

The objective of this chapter is to present the statutory and administrative authority
designed to address the topic of reasonable compensation. Prior research in the reasonable
compensation and gender arena are presented and discussed.

Historical Background
Code Sec. 162(a)(1)
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 addresses reasonable compensation in Code
Section 162(a)(1). Section 162(a)(1) provides for an ordinary and necessary expense
deduction for expenses paid or incurred for reasonable allowance pertaining to salaries or
other compensation for actually rendered personal services.

U.S. Treasury Regulation 1.162
With less than clear guidance in the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. Treasury
Regulations provide additional assistance.

Treas. Reg. 1.162-7(a) provides that

deductibility of compensation payments relates to whether the payments are reasonable
and are made purely for services. Naturally, when compensation exceeds salaries paid for
similar services, the excessive payments will receive dividend treatment as though from a
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distribution of earnings from stock. Reg. Sec. 1.162-7 (b)(1) expands its explanation by
describing an ostensible salary paid by a company as a dividend distribution on stock. This
happens in corporations with few shareholders in situations where the shareholders all
receive salaries payments. When the salaries paid closely parallel the stockholdings o f the
employees or officers, it can signal that salaries are not paid solely for services rendered.
In that situation, it would appear the salary is being paid as a distribution of earnings. Reg.
Sec. 1.162-7 (b)(2) posits that how the compensation is formed or the method used to fix
the compensation does not always decide deductibility. Moreover, a flat rate compensation
does not receive differing treatment from contingent compensation because both forms of
compensation will receive equal scrutiny.

Reg. Sec. 1.162-7(b)(3) also asserts

compensation that is characterized as true and reasonable needs to be compensation paid
“for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.”

Additionally,

circumstances surrounding the compensation paid needs to occur at the date the contract
was created for the services, not the date the contract is challenged. Reg. Sec. 1.162-8
explains the excess compensation treatment. This regulation holds when the payments
exceeding reasonableness mirror or closely align with stockholdings and is deemed to be
earnings or profit distribution, then those excess payments will receive dividend treatment.
Last, Reg. Sec. 1.162-9 specifically targets bonuses.

This regulation provides that

employee bonuses will also be allowed as a deduction from gross income when the
payments are made for services actually rendered and in good faith. However, the bonus
payments cannot exceed reasonable compensation for the rendered services.
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Revenue Ruling 79-8
Revenue Ruling 79-8 offers specific guidance when a corporation has not paid
more than a small amount of dividends from earnings since this situation can catch the
attention of the IRS. Various cases were discussed within this ruling. These included
Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United States11, Botany Worsted Mills v. United
Statesn , Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner13, Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner14,
Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner15, and Edwin’s Inc. v. United States}6 Each
case involved dividend history. After careful examination, the revenue ruling indicated
that a closely held corporation failing to pay out more than a small portion of its earnings
as dividends is a very important factor when determining the deductibility of paid
compensation to a shareholder-employee of a corporation. Nonetheless, once the facts
and circumstances surrounding compensation provide support to the reasonableness o f the
compensation, deductions shall not be disallowed because small dividends have been paid
out on its outstanding stock.

Literature Review
The topics of reasonable compensation and gender effects on decision-making
have been studied by researchers in the past. However, they have not been studied

11422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970)
12 278 U.S. 282 (1929), Ct. D. 39, VIII-1 C.B. 279 (1929)
13 T.C. Memo 1975-229
14 T.C. Memo 1971-200
15 500 F. 2d 148, 153 (8* Cir. 1974)
16 501 F. 2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974)
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together. The research conducted in the reasonable compensation arena has focused on
determining which factors are deemed most significant when the IRS disallows a portion
of the reasonable compensation claimed by the taxpayer. Moreover, the research done in
the gender effect arena has looked at valuation in estate tax cases, innocent spouse relief,
differences in ideology, differences in culture, hiring decisions, voting patterns, ethical
judgments, identifying a “just society”, ethical behaviors, decisions in arbitration, and
employee evaluation.

Theory
Critical Mass Theory
Kanter (1977)
In the Kanter (1977) article, a framework is discussed pertaining to dominants and
tokens. Four types of groups are discussed. The first group type is a uniform group
consisting of one of kind of person and one significant social type. The typological ration
for a uniform group is 100:0. The second group type is a skewed group. The ratio for a
skewed group would be 85:15. The dominants can be described in this group as the
individuals controlling the group and the culture. The token, on the other hand, represents
the smaller portion of individuals opposing the dominants and are typically treated as
symbols of their category as opposed to individuals. The tilted group has a ratio of 65:35
and the balanced group has a ratio of 50:50. Specifically, within the skewed group, tokens
are either alone or are virtually alone and must act on behalf of their ascribed category
whether they want to or not. The U.S. Tax Court has 33 total judges (15 regular, 14 senior,
and four special) who can preside over a case. Currently, of the 15 U.S. Tax Court regular
judges, two are female representing a ratio of 13:2 or 87:13. Of the 14 senior judges on
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the U.S. Tax Court, three are female demonstrating a ratio of 11:3 or 79:21. Last, the four
special judges are all male. The overall ratio including regular, senior, and special U.S.
Tax Court judges is 85:15 (28 male; five female).17 This ratio is on par with the skewed
group ratio.

According to the Kanter (1977) article, the women judges would be

considered tokens. Additionally, three perceptual phenomena are associated with token
status. These three phenomena are visibility, polarization, and assimilation (Kanter 1977).
Visibility can be described as receiving a higher awareness share since there is less of this
type of individual as compared to one of the dominants. Polarization focuses on the idea
that having a token as part of the group will result in dominant members of the group
determining common characteristics and differing characteristics from the token
individual. Last, assimilation can be defined as taking the token’s characteristics and
distorting them to fit the generalization (Kanter 1977). The impact on the token is
performance pressure, isolation of the token, group boundary heightening, and role
entrapment.

Social Identity Theory
A second underlying theory pertaining to individuals and decision-making is social
identity theory. First, a “social group” is perceived as a collection of individuals who
identify themselves as members of the same social category. Furthermore, they may have
similar emotional involvement in how they define themselves. Last, the individuals may
come to a collective understanding as to the evaluation of the group and their being a part
o f it (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity can be described as aspects of an individual’s

17 https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm
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self-image that originate from the social categories to which the individual finds himself
or herself belonging (Tajfel and Tuner 1979). The social group and social identity in this
study is the gender group. Specifically, one question is whether female judges identify
with female taxpayers as being in their same group. The same inquiry also arises with male
judges and male taxpayers. Conversely, social identity theory provides for out-group
discrimination. Therefore, female judges under this theory would treat males worse than
their female counterparts and vice versa.

Reasonable Compensation Empirical Research
Englebrecht et al. (2014)
The Englebrecht et al. (2014) study investigated reasonable compensation in
closely-held corporations. Specifically, this study only focused on cases litigated in the
U.S. Tax Court. The time period spanned 1991 through 2011. This resulted in 53 cases.
The final sample resulted in 145 individual observations because several cases included
more than one year and/or people. Of the ten factors included in the original model
(employee qualification, nature, extent, and scope of employee’s work, business size and
complexity, comparison of salaries paid to net and gross income, prevailing general
economic conditions, comparison of salaries with distributions to shareholders, rates of
compensation for comparable positions/companies, employer’s salary policy as to all
employees, conflict of interest, and compensation paid in previous years), four were
deemed significant. These four significant factors included factor four (comparison of
salaries paid to net and gross income), six (comparison of salaries with distributions to
shareholders), seven (rates of compensation for comparable positions/companies), and
eight (employer’s salary policy as to all employees). Logistic regression was used in this
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article. Additionally, the model was able to predict with 100% accuracy a holdout sample
of randomly selected cases.

Carpenter (1984)
The Carpenter (1984) dissertation targeted creating a better understanding o f the
term “reasonableness” as it relates to closely-held corporations and owner-operators. The
original model employed consisted of 26 independent variables.

These independent

variables were pulled from the internal revenue code, treasury regulations, Mayson Mfg.
Co. vs. Commissioner, 49-2 USTC f9467 (CA -6,1949) and other cases, and the IRS Audit
Guidelines tests. The independent variables included:
employee’s qualifications, nature, extent, and scope of employee’s work, size of
the business, complexity of the business, comparison of owner’s salary paid to
gross income and comparison of owner’s salary paid to net income, general
economic conditions, dividend history of the firm, comparison of owner’s salary
paid to industry averages, salary structure of the firm, average compensation paid
to owner-operator in prior years, formality and timing of the board of directors,
salary increase or bonuses paid to owners in property to stockholdings, future
prospects of the firm, living conditions of the particular locality, time devoted to
other businesses by the owner-operator, scarcity of other qualified employees,
employee’s responsibility for the firm’s inception and/or success, existence of a
contingent compensation formula, comparison of owner’s salary paid in contested
years to earlier years, a compensation plan consistently followed, owner
compensation payments as incentive to remain with the firm, firm’s financial
condition after owner compensation payments, owner compensation payments as

23
tax avoidance scheme, extent of control exerted by owner-operator, and expert
witness testimony.
The dependent variables were either considered a “taxpayer win” (meaning the
court ruled for 100% of the amount claimed by the taxpayer) or a “taxpayer loss” (meaning
the court sided with the IRS disallowing 100% of the challenged amount).

The

methodology used was stepwise logistic regression or logit. The data was comprised of
165 Tax Court cases and 44 U.S. District Court cases. Also, the predictive ability o f the
Tax Court logistic regression model was then tested on the cases heard in the U.S. District
Court. One of the results indicate a five-variable Tax Court Logit Model was capable of
correctly categorizing 97% of the 165 observations/cases on reasonable compensation
decided between 1950 and 1980. Similarly, a second eight-variable Tax Court Logit model
was able to accurately classify 96.4% of the cases heard in the U.S. Tax Court. These
models had similar success in predicting cases heard in the U.S. District Court.
Furthermore, the researchers found courts are more likely to rule in favor of unreasonable
compensation when the employee has marginal qualifications for the job, there is
vagueness to the scope and nature of the employee’s duties, the salary of the owner is
exceedingly higher than the other employee salaries in the firm, the business is not very
profitable, and the salary of the owner is significantly higher in the year under investigation
compared to earlier years. This study added to the literature by providing a model useful
for the Service and the taxpayer. As a result, the taxpayer could use this model when
creating future compensation plans. This model could also assist in relieving the large
amount of cases burdening the judicial system. Last, this research shows that logistic
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regression is an appropriate form of statistical analysis for cases ruling on reasonable
compensation.

Porcano (1982)
The Porcano (1982) article assessed the Tax Court’s determination of reasonable
compensation.

The purpose behind this study was to construct a predictive multiple

regression model capable of forecasting the compensation amount permitted by the courts
as a percentage o f the disputed amount between the IRS and the taxpayer. The sample
consisted o f 86 court cases spanning January 1, 1970 through December 31, 1979. The
total number of observations summed to 219 with the court awarding to the firm 100% of
the amount claimed 42% of the time and the court awarding at least 70 percent o f the
claimed amount 51.5 percent of the time. The judicial forum was limited to the Tax Court.
Decisions made by the District Court, Court of Claims, Court of Appeals, and the Supreme
Court were eliminated from the analysis because of insufficient number of cases or lack of
consistent authority between circuits and districts. The original model started with 33
variables. O f these 33 variables, 28 were dichotomous, 14 of the 28 variables were dummy
variables, three variables had values from one to three, and one variable had a value from
one to four.

The final stepwise multiple regression model included 15 variables.

Therefore, 18 variables were dropped from the model. The R2 of the final model was 0.825
indicating that the model was able to explain approximately 83% o f the variation in the
predicted variable of settlement value or the percent of the amount disputed with the IRS.
The overall results of this analysis offered a company’s management a framework to
evaluate contested reasonable compensation decisions heard in the U.S. Tax Court.
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Hoffinan (1979)
In the Hoffinan (1979) article, reasonable compensation cases are examined to see
which factors tend to have the most significance in determining the final outcome of a case
heard either in the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. District Court (separating out cases with a jury
from those without a jury), and the U.S. Court of Claims. The data used included court
decisions heard between January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1977. This resulted in 90
reasonable compensation cases totaling 162 shareholder-employees. The data was divided
into three categories. In those cases where the court rendered a decision of at least twothirds of the compensation disputed, the decision was deemed a “win” for the taxpayer. In
cases where the court ruled for one-third or less of the disputed amount, the decision was
considered a “win” by the IRS.

In those instances, where the court figures the

compensation amount to be more than one-third but less than two-thirds, the decision is
considered a compromise decision. The researchers also divided out cases based on total
annual compensation. The levels of compensation were also separated out into: 1) $0$25,000, 2) $25,001-$50,000, 3) $50,001-$75,000, 4) $75,001-$100,000 5) $100,001$150,000 and 6) over $150,000. The results concluded that taxpayers will have the best
chance to win a reasonable compensation case when exhibiting the following
characteristics: 1) the taxpayer exhibits managerial responsibility over all o f the aspects of
the operation and dedicates a significant amount of time leading the corporation’s affairs,
2) the corporation is experiencing success and the success is attributable to the shareholderemployee, 3) the salary and contingent-compensation o f the shareholder-employee is fixed
by the board of directors at the beginning of the period., 4) the contingent compensation
formula for the industry is common and can include employees who are not shareholders

but do have managerial responsibility, 5) contingent compensation that is non-pro rata
based on stockholdings when there is greater than one shareholder-employee, and 6) the
corporation has distributed at least minimal dividends annually.

On other hand, the

characteristics o f the taxpayer that tend to result in losses consist of: 1) a division of effort
and time by the shareholder-employee between various businesses, 2) a bonus is paid
towards the end of the year once operating results are determined, 3) the shareholderemployee’s services performed remains consistent but the compensation figure increases
significantly, 4) non-shareholder employees are not included in the bonus arrangement and
bonuses or compensation are pro-rata based on shareholdings, and 5) a dividend has never
been paid by the corporation. Some other results indicate the judicial forum, having a jury
versus not having a jury, and the compensation amount can all affect the outcome o f the
case (see Table 2.1)

Judicial Decision-Making Empirical Research
Glynn and Sen (2015)
In the Glynn and Sen (2015) article, the researchers focus on determining whether
personal relationships affect how judges make decisions in court. The specific relationship
studied is whether the judges have a daughter. Four theories are posited by the authors
supporting how personal relationships can impact decision-making. These four theories
consist of preference alignment, lobbying, learning, and protectionism. The data used in
this article includes cases heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals (judicial decisions in non-tax
arena) between 1996 and 2002. The final count regarding votes cast and number of judges
was 2,674 and 244, respectively.
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Nevertheless, fertility data was available for only 224 judges. The appellate court
is considered a middle tier court in the federal court system. The methodology employed
was weighted least squares regression, logistic regression, and ordered logistic regression.
The results indicate that relationships can have an effect on judges’ voting behavior. Other
results suggest the theories currently surrounding judicial politics needs to be revisited
and expanded. Last, male judges tend to vote more liberally when they have daughters.

Jackson et al. (2013)
The Jackson et al. (2013) article considered the court’s part in asset and business
valuation from an estate tax perspective. The main argument centers on how the court
valuates the issues brought by the taxpayer and the Commissioner (IRS). The authors use
126 combined cases resulting in 174 court valuation determinations. The time period
under inquiry spanned January 1, 1986 to December 31, 2010 which was similar to the
analysis conducted in the Englebrecht and Davison (1977) study. The judicial forum in
this study consists of the Tax Court and the District Court. Additionally, most of the cases
were heard in the Tax Court. The main finding from this article advocates although the
court’s decision and the mean between the taxpayer’s and IRS claimed figures are highly
correlated, the court does not simply split the disputed amounts down the middle.

Greenaway (2009)
The Greenaway (2009) paper highlights the judicial forums when litigating a
federal civil tax issue. The various forums include U.S. bankruptcy courts, the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Tax Court. Furthermore, when a tax
issue is heard in court, the taxpayer is bringing either a refund suit or a prepayment action.
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A taxpayer should consider several items when deciding to take a decision before the court.
These considerations include timing, money, and whether or not this is a new issue to name
a few. Surprisingly, judges presiding in the Tax Court tend to rule relatively quickly trying
to avoid laborious trials. On the other hand, District Court trials seem to take longer when
compared with Tax Court trials. Also, when the Tax Court is confronted with a valuation
case, through the use of analytical approaches and weighing in on the opinions and facts
of both parties in litigation, the judiciary will reach conclusions neither party wanted.18
Other significant factors in need of consideration include potential appellate venue and
controlling precedent. Additionally, the Tax Court will render one of four different types
of opinions: summary opinions, bench opinions, division opinions, and memorandum
opinions.19 The only opinion of the four that exerts controlling precedent is the division
opinion. Last, the taxpayer should contemplate who will be deciding the case. Does a
taxpayer want a generalist, a tax specialist, or a specialist in money disagreements with the
government?

Posner (2008)
The Posner (2008) article targeted judges’ political biases and whether these biases
or other characteristics impacted the voting patterns of judges. This author posits that the
judiciary is comprised o f judges who align with the majority’s partisan bias and judges
who align with the out-of-power minority’s partisan bias. Consequently, judges render
decisions based on their own biases. Two types of biases are explained. The first bias is

18 E.g., Estate o f Auker v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2321, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) f 98,185 (Cited in
Greenaway -2009 article).
19 Honourable Mary Ann Cohen, How to Read Tax Court Opinions, 2000 Hous. Bus.
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political bias. Political bias is described as an ideological or partisan bias which can be
further broken down into a desire for an outcome to the right or left of an impartial outcome.
Personal bias, on the other hand, is making a decision based on helping family and friends
or to receive personal financial gain. Other biases that play a role in decision-making are
implicit and explicit biases. An explicit bias is defined as the conscious desire to create an
outcome the judge knows is incorrect, if it satisfies a party or other constituency. Implicit
bias arises because each individual views the world differently. Furthermore, judicial
review is very important because it results in the enacting of statutes that are fair and
efficient because little possibility exist of highly unfair laws remaining after appeal.
Thereby, laws that are deemed fair will probably outlast repeal. Last, judges should be
assessed based on three dimensions: legislative competence, ideology, and judicial
competence.

Howard (2007)
The Howard (2007) study focuses on litigation patterns, national policy, and court
preferences where taxpayers were litigating in either the District Court or the Tax Court
between 1994 and 2000. The dependent variable used by the researchers was created by
taking the amount of lawsuits filed in the Tax Court and dividing that figure by the amount
of lawsuits filed in the District Courts per state by year. The results appear to show forum
shopping does occur when choosing to litigate. Furthermore, taxpayers making decisions
based on the highest chance of winning leads them to choose the Tax Court over the District
Court. Additionally, the conservative nature of the Tax Court also encourages taxpayers
to shy away from the District Court and seek out the Tax Court.
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DiGabriele (2006)
The DiGabriele (2006) article examines the question o f whether methods of
valuation of closely held businesses selected by courts was a result of case type and court
level. The data used in this study was gathered from the Business Valuation Resources,
LLC database and looked at the timeframe between January 1994 and December 2000.
The dependent variable was the preferred valuation method/approach. The independent
variables used consisted of the case type, whether a State or federal case, and type of
industry.

The final data sample was comprised of 164 cases.

The results suggest

systematic trends relating to preferences among the courts for differing valuation
approaches and methods.

Beatty et al. (1999)
In the Beatty et al. (1999) article, statistical property predictions are compared to
the positions o f valuations taken by judges, taxpayers, and the IRS in cases regarding gift
and estate tax. Specifically, the part of the study pertaining to estate and gift tax valuation
included 31 cases.

The results tend to suggest that many o f the common valuation

approaches are not preferred. Also, regression is advocated as a potential alternative for
estimating values. Last, the conclusions reached tend to show the Tax Court is very
effective in evaluating privately held firms and assigning proper values to them.

Englebrecht and Jamison (1979)
In the Englebrecht and Jamison (1979) study, the researchers examined whether a
“compromiser model” was used by the Tax Court when litigated over charitable
contribution property valuations. The data included 41 Tax Court judgments covering 67
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valuations (real estate, manuscripts, works of art, furniture, dogs, a computer, etc.)
spanning January 1, 1970 through April 30, 1977. The variables gathered from each case
were the taxpayer’s claimed amount, the figure permitted by the IRS, and the Court’s
determination. A simple regression and chi-square test were used in the study. The
conclusions reached were that the Tax Court did not make decisions in a compromising
manner.

Additionally, the specific property of manuscripts and real estate were not

assigned values bigger or smaller than other property types. Moreover, the Court seemed
to evaluate each case on its own merit seeking to assign an equitable and fair value based
on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.

Madeo (1979)
In the Madeo (1979) article, the objective of the study was to find the variables that
distinguish cases lost and won by the taxpayer when litigated on the basis of the
accumulated earnings cases.

The data pool consisted of 67 post-1954 accumulated

earnings cases brought before the Tax Court which was then narrowed down to 59 cases
falling between the dates of 1954 and 1970. Three groups were identified. These groups
were broken into “winners” designated as owing no tax, “losers” designated as paying
some portion of tax, and “split decisions” designated as owing no tax for some years and
paying tax for other years. A stepwise discriminant analysis was used as the methodology.
The findings suggest the IRS variables were able to create better results than using the
regulation variables (see Table 2.2).
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Gender Empirical Research
Several gender studies have been conducted related to decision making in various
arenas.

These forums include court, ideology, the workplace, and across cultures.

Empirical and behavioral studies have targeted this cumbersome area of research.
Researchers have used survey vignettes along with decisions rendered in court and other
survey instruments.

Pippin et al. (2014)
The Pippin et al. (2014) study examined court rulings in estate tax cases. The main
dependent variable was the difference between the taxpayer/IRS mean and the court
valuation divided by the mean. This dependent variable was regressed on 10 variables
to include gender, number of appraisers used by the taxpayer, number of appraisers
used by the IRS, whether or not appointed by a Republican president, and business
valuation to name a few. The sample included the 25-year timeframe spanning 1986
to 2010. This consisted of 126 combined cases and 174 court valuation determinations.
This study of the relationship between estate court valuations and judges’ attributes
concluded that the type of asset being valued, the quantity of appraisers employed by the
taxpayer, and the complexity and age of the case played a significant role in the judiciary’s
decisions. The results suggest that male judges tend to rule in favor of the taxpayer when
the dispute involves valuation.

Pierce etal. (2013)
The Pierce et al. (2013) article evaluated the effects of taxpayer perception and
gender on the provisions of innocent spouse relief. Specifically, their article studied
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whether Revenue Procedure 2003-61 was an improvement over Revenue Procedure
2000-15. The sample included 370 responses from females and 151 responses from
males. After elimination of participants who failed the manipulation check, the usable
responses totaled 367. The results of this article implied that taxpayers have different
perceptions of expectations on what the Service should do and what the Service would do
when making a decision on equitable relief. Gender biases were also found pertaining to
both genders. Specifically, males grant equitable relief more when a male is the requesting
spouse. Additionally, Revenue Procedure 2003-61 was an improvement over Revenue
Procedure 2000-15.

Collins et al. (2010)
The Collins et al. (2010) article studied the gender role in legal decision making in
cases litigated in the U.S. Federal District Courts through the application of critical mass
theory. That is, the researchers determined whether male jurists displayed behavior that
was different from the female jurists. Critical mass theory suggests when women work in
a profession that is dominated mostly be men, they will align their thinking with that o f the
men. It is not until later when women’s numbers increase do they begin to make decisions
separate from their male colleagues. The data used in this study was taken from the Federal
Supplement and focused on the decisions rendered by U.S. District Court judges. The
timeframe extended from 1977 to 2000.

The dependent variable was the decision’s

ideological direction as being either liberal or conservative. The types of cases consisted
of labor and economic regulation, civil rights and liberties, and criminal justice. The results
imply the decision-making exhibited by male judges is significantly different from female
judges as the quantity of females serving at a court point rises. Moreover, differences in
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gender were the largest in cases of a criminal nature with women having a higher
probability of making a liberal decision than males when critical mass was reached. Last,
the presence of other women in the profession appears to also play a role in how decisions
are made.

Norrander and Wilcox (2008)
The Norrander and Wilcox (2008) article examines differences in gender in
ideology. The database used by the researchers was the National Election Studies survey
(ANES) cumulative data file. Evidence is found pertaining to a consistent gender gap, a
shifting gender gap in the issues and groups related to ideological identities, and general
changes over time. That is, the results suggest females and males overtime become more
willing to choose an ideological identity and that both genders have become more
conservative over time. Additionally, in one segment women have become more liberal.
Conversely, men have been shown to become more conservative on a consistent basis and
more Republican as time passes even though women have not experienced as much change.
Last, men seem to only become more conservative while women have a tendency to exhibit
more conservative and more liberal characteristics.
Roxas and Stoneback (2004)
In the Roxas and Stoneback (2004) article, the authors explore the role gender plays
when decisions are made across different cultures. The data were comprised of 750 junior
and senior accounting students originating from eight different countries (U.S.A., Canada,
Australia, China, Philippines, Thailand, Germany, and Ukraine). The percentage of female
participants ranges from a low of 20.3 in Germany to a high of 65.9% in the Philippines.
The majority of subjects came from the U.S.A. (136) and the least amount of subjects came
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from Australia (39). The instrument implemented was an ethical vignette coming from the
Arthur Andersen Business Ethics Program. The vignette outlined an employee named Jim
and described a situation where he realized he has made a forecast error and is not sure
what to do since his promotion is on the horizon. Six questions are then provided to the
subjects and must be answered through using a seven point Likert scale. The results from
this study tend to be mixed in nature. Overall, the results denote females are more ethical.
On the other hand, significant differences only appear in two of the countries (China and
Ukraine).

Hardin et al. (2002)
In the Hardin et al. (2002) article, the authors were trying to determine if hiring
decisions were affected by either the accounting firm recruiter’s gender or the gender of
the entry-level accountant. The sample consisted of 159 recruiters spanning ten states.
These subjects were employed by the Big Five firms. Female recruiters accounted for 39%
with male recruiters making up the other 61%. The research instrument was a variation of
the instrument used in the Moncada and Sanders (1999) study with that used in the Hardin
and Socks (1995) study. Each subject was informed that he or she would be recruiting for
an entry-level position and given information describing the potential employee. Next, the
participant would give each student a score ranging from zero to 100 and provide a salary
offer. The results suggest the recruiter’s gender did not have an effect on the rating
assigned to the employee prospect nor did it affect salary offer deemed appropriate by the
recruiter. Moreover, an interesting finding did occur. Male recruits were offered a higher
salary than female recruits when interacting with a female recruiter.
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Segal (2000)
In the Segal (2000) article, the researchers try to answer the inquiry whether the
appointments made by President Clinton to the Federal District Court have resulted in
policy representation to the groups represented. The methodology used consisted of a
pairing strategy through various characteristics.

These characteristics included both

political and demographic. The pool the judges were taken from was the presidential
appointments made by Clinton between the years of 1993 and 1996. There were 13 gender
pairs, 12 race pairs totaling 39 judges in all. The dates of the cases started January 13,
1994 and ended May 25, 1999. The total number of cases involved in the gender analysis
was 799 cases. The results imply that even though the gender and race of Clinton’s
appointees differ from the so-called traditional roles of that period, the decisions by the
non-traditional judges are not necessarily more likely to sustain a judicial role that is
susceptible to the assertions of numerous out-groups in American culture.

Smith and Rogers (2000)
In the Smith and Rogers (2000) article, gender-based differences are examined
using specific situation vignettes. Two theoretical frameworks are targeted to include
gender socialization theory and occupational socialization theory. The data consisted of
public accounting and industry accountants along with upper-level accounting students
from a southwestern regional university in the United States. Four vignettes were used
followed by two questions addressing the ethics of the individual’s actions and the
probability the individual would act in the same manner as the individual described in the
vignette. In two of the scenarios (Scenario 2 and 3), a “gray” situation was described
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potentially prompting gender biases. The results of this article imply both genders tended
to side with the female actors’ ethical actions.
Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000)
The Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000) study examines whether the voting pattern
exhibited between female judges and their male colleagues is different. The two political
areas of judicial policy explored in this article are civil liberties and criminal justice. The
methodology used to estimate the parameters was logistic regression. The data is derived
from all of the state supreme courts (two states have separate last resort courts for criminal
and civil cases totaling 52 state supreme courts). The obscenity cases were decided from
1982 to 1993. Also, due to the large nature of death penalty cases, a selected sample was
derived from that same timeframe. There are various results found by the researchers.
First, male judges do not vote as liberally as their female colleagues with regards to death
penalty and obscenity cases. Also, when male judges have female colleagues, males tend
to vote for more liberal outcomes.

Cohen and Sharp (1998)
In the Cohen and Sharp (1998) study, gender differences were assessed with regards
to ethical judgments (ethical orientation, ethical intention, and ethical evaluations). The
sample included undergraduate students majoring in business and liberal arts from four
universities located in the Northeastern United States. The breakdown of the subjects used
was 307 female, 338 male, 194 accounting majors, 311 non-accounting business majors,
and 140 liberal arts majors. The researchers used the Multidimensional Ethics Scale and
eight business ethic vignettes. The vignettes tended to be a more general situation based
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on the sample audience being used. The scenarios varied from describing a situation where
a product has not undergone the proper amount of testing but the sales person authorizes
the promotion and sale of the production anyway to a situation where a manager authorizes
a “good will gesture” payment to a local distributor manager in a foreign country to name
a few. Overall, the results seem to indicate there are gender effects on how questionable
actions are examined with women perceiving questionable actions to be less ethical and
therefore seem to have less intentions to carry out these actions compared to their male
counterpart.

Prasad et a l (1998)
In the Prasad et al. (1998) article, the authors strives to understand and recognize
how respondents would describe a “just society” and identify if any differences exist based
on gender. The data used by the researchers amounted to 191 students with 98 female and
93 male. The data had approximately 90% business majors. The participants were pooled
from a population of nearly 2,000 university business students. Furthermore, no random
sampling techniques were implemented.

The questionnaire administered had 51

statements to examine the subjects’ opinions of a “just society” using a five point Likert
scale. Some specific results relating to gender differences centered on 10 statements where
differences were found because of gender. Additionally, in four of the 10 statements
females and males failed to agree based on their average responses.

Schminke (1997)
In the Schminke (1997) article, the individual’s gender and manager’s ethical
decision models are studied to determine if a relationship exist. The data included a final
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sample size of 165 after eliminating those questionnaires failing to be accurately
completed.

The subjects consisted of full-time managers and senior undergraduate

students majoring in business. The gender composition was 32% female and 68% male.
Moreover, three vignettes were used in this study. These vignettes were rated as either
neutral, utilitarian, or formalist. Naturally, after reading through each vignette, subjects
were to decide whether the individual portrayed in the vignette made the correct decision,
whether the reasons leading to the decision were correct, and whether the decision made
by the individual was typical. The third decision specifically addressed the issue o f gender.
Overall, the results indicate that differences in gender do affect the subjects’ reaction to
others’ ethical quandaries.

Smith and Oakley (1997)
In the Smith and Oakley (1997) article, the gender relationship is observed with
regards to evaluating ethically acceptable behaviors in the workplace. The data were
comprised of undergraduate and graduate students from a public state university and a fouryear nonsectarian private college of which both are located in a southeastern state. The
student population of the public university was approximately 23,000 students and the
student population of the private university was approximately 1,600 students. The total
number of respondents summed to 318 subjects with 174 being male and 144 being female.
A 16-item instrument was used identifying 16 hypothetical business scenarios seeking the
response of the subjects on how they viewed the various situations as being ethically
acceptable always or never ethically acceptable. The conclusions reached from this study
show gender-related differences do not exist when assessing the ethical behaviors
pertaining to violation of organization policies or the law.
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Songer et al. (1994)
The Songer et al. (1994) study explored the United States Court of Appeals judge’s
behavior in order to unravel whether gender is affecting voting behavior differences. The
data sample consisted o f regular United States Court of Appeals judges from the 11
numbered circuits and the District of Columbia circuit spanning the timeframe from 1981
to 1990. Specifically, three types of cases are evaluated. These cases include obscenity,
employment discrimination, and search and seizure cases. The methodology employed is
logit or logistic regression. Results are divided. With regards to search and seizure and
obscenity cases, no gender differences are found in voting behavior. Gender differences
do exist in employment discrimination cases. The overall results imply that gender effect
on decisions made by judges depends on the situation surrounding the decision-making
process.

Bemmels (1988)
In the Bemmels (1988) article, the grievant’s gender is investigated to see if a
relationship exist with the arbitrator’s decisions regarding discharge.

The arbitration

decisions were filed between the dates of January 1,1981 and June 30,1983 with the Public
Service Employee Relations Board or the Director of Mediation Services. The researchers
chose to only focus on the disciplinary discharge arbitrations. The final sample totaled 104
cases with 61 cases having a grievance sustained ruling and 43 cases having a grievance
denied. Moreover, 31 o f the grievants were women and 73 of the grievants were male.
The result imply that male grievants were treated more harshly by male arbitrators than
female grievants were in the discharge arbitration cases.
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Jackson etal. (1985)
In the Jackson et al. (1985) article, reward allocations were the focus of the study
based on two gender-related variables. The gender-related variables were the gender role
of the allocator and the gender role of a co-worker of the opposite sex. The data was
composed of 74 female and 74 male undergraduate students from an introductory
psychology course enticed by extra credit for participating. The instrument the researchers
used was the Bern Sex Role Inventory (Short Form) to distinguish between the gender role
of the subjects and to manipulate the co-workers’ gender role.

Four groups were

determined as masculine, feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated. Also, a post-task
questionnaire was administered.

The results of this study conclude that masculine

coworkers were awarded less generous allocations than the feminine co-workers.

Walker and Barrow (1985)
The Walker and Barrow (1985) study focused on nontraditional judges such as
female and black judges by specifically looking at the policy and process consequences of
adding these judges to the U.S. District Court. The District court was selected in this article
because this forum has the highest amount of these types of judges (minority and female).
The instrument employed was a “matched pair” strategy. From a gender comparison
standpoint, twenty four judges were used and were matched up in twelve female-male
pairs. Gender-differences were found in some areas and not found in others. The areas
gender-differences did not exist were in cases involving women’s rights and criminal
policy. On the other hand, females were less likely to rule in favor of minority policy and
personal liberty claims.

Therefore, the results suggest that women tended to render

decisions in favor of government entities. One possible explanation extended by the
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authors is women have received more preferential treatment from the government than
from nongovernmental entities.

Welch (1985)
The Welch (1985) article focuses on answering the question on whether women
exhibit more liberal voting patterns than men in the House of Representatives. The data
sample covered four congresses from 1972 through 1980. The dependent variable was the
Congressional Quarterly’s coalition support score and the independent variable was the
judge’s gender. The methodology employed was multiple regression. The results conclude
that men tend to vote in a less liberal direction than women in Congress. Also, the
difference among the genders in regarding voting behavior has lessened over time.

Oliphant and Alexander (1982)
In the Oliphant and Alexander (1982) article, the relationship of resume
determinateness (defined as lack of ambuity) and prospective employer evaluation was
examined. With each applicant, four variables were identified. These variables include
academic achievement depicted through listing a GPA or not listing a GPA, marital status
categorized as single, married, or not listed, age depicted through a younger age or an older
age, and sex categorized as male, female, or not listed. The data sample included six female
and six male personnel professionals. Each professional was assigned to assist in a
selection and screening process for large firms located in the Mid-South. The industries
involved manufacturing, service, and distribution industries. Each personnel profession
was given the task to ascribe a probability that an applicant would receive a
recommendation for a management trainee position. A score of seven meant that the
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professional assigned a probability of “highly likely that I would recommend for an
interview” with a score of one indicating a probability of “highly unlikely that I would
recommend for an interview.” The results conclude that there is a significant difference
between the female and male raters when evaluating the resumes of females and males.
Additionally, males seem to have significantly lower demands on the applicants.

Gruhl etal. (1981)
The Gruhl et al. (1981) study considered male and female public officials and the
patterns in their rendered decisions. Specifically, the researchers evaluated how judges
convict and sentence to determine if a systematic difference arose. The data sample
consisted of women and men judges from a city located in the northeastern United States.
The timeframe extended from 1971 to September 1979. The number of cases totaled
32,529. The methodology used was a difference of means test and multiple regression.
The results provide little support that female judges were more lenient than their male
counterparts. On the other hand, some results suggest that women tend to be harsher when
sentencing females to prison. Also, men are more likely to sentence men to prison than
sentencing women to prison.

Rose andAndiappan (1978)
In the Rose and Andiappan (1978) article, participants were asked to assess
managerial position applicants based on being either male or female (see Tables 2.3 and
2.4). The total number of subjects was 75 with 20 being female and 55 being male. Those
partaking in the study were upper division business administration students.
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Each student was given the role of considering a fictitious applicant who was
applying for a branch banking firm managerial position. The subjects were then required
to evaluate each applicant on four criteria to include 1) the chance of being an overall
success on the job, 2) the chance of having a long career with the employer, 3) the chance
of satisfying the firm’s customers, and 4) keeping the subordinates working under the
applicant satisfied. The results seem to specify when male and female applicants are
evaluated and show comparable characteristics, the applicant’s gender by itself does not
appear to be significant. Yet, a strong effect exists when the sexes of the subordinate and
applicant match.

Summary
There has been limited empirical research on reasonable compensation.
Additionally, the research conducted in the gender area in accounting/taxation has been
scarce addressing the following areas: valuation in estate tax cases (Pippin et al. 2014),
innocent spouse relief (Pierce et al. 2013), differences in ideology (Norrander and Wilcox
2008), differences in culture (Roxas and Stoneback 2004), hiring decisions (Segal 2000),
voting patterns (Songer and Crews-Meyer 2000; Songer et al. 1994; Welch 1985; Gruhl et
al. 1981), ethical judgments (Smith and Rogers 2000; Cohen et al. 1998), identifying a
“just society” (Prasad et al. 1998), ethical behaviors (Smith and Oakley 1997), decisions
in arbitration (Bemmels 1988), and employee evaluation (Oliphant and Alexander 1982;
Rose and Andiappan 1978). However, no prior research has examined the effects of
gender, political affiliation, and family composition in the corporate and individual income
tax arena involving reasonable compensation.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the research questions and identify the
hypotheses and procedures to be used in addressing these questions. Also, development
of the survey, participant selection, and data analysis are presented.

Research Questions
This study examines the following research questions on reasonable
compensation and gender.
1) Is there a significant difference in how male and female judges render a
reasonable compensation decision?
2) Do judges simply come to a “Compromise” decision, represented as the
arithmetic mean, when deciding a reasonable compensation case?
3) Are male judges more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation for
the taxpayer than female judges?
4) Are judges more likely to decide on a higher amount of compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge (male/male or female/female)?
5) Are male taxpayers more likely to receive a higher amount of compensation than
female taxpayers?
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6) Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
of ruling in favor of the taxpayer than a judge selected by a Democratic president?
7) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer when the
taxpayer presents at least one appraiser?
8) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS when the Service
chooses to have at least one appraiser?
9) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer’s claimed
value when multiple tax years are involved?
10) Do judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter?

Hypotheses - Archival Portion
The following hypotheses are derived from the research questions and are in their
alternate form pertaining to the archival portion.
Hi:

There is a statistically significant difference between male and female judge
decisions in reasonable compensation cases.

H2 :

The “Compromise” amount (arithmetic mean) will be significant in explaining
the Court’s determined figure.

H3 :

Male judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation for
the taxpayer than female judges.

H3A:

Male judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount o f compensation when the
taxpayer is male as opposed to a female taxpayer.

H3B:

Female judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when
the taxpayer is female compared to a male taxpayer.
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HU:

Male taxpayers are more likely to receive a compensation decision higher than
female taxpayers.

H5 :

Judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability of
ruling in favor of the taxpayer than a judge named by a Democratic president.

He:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer when the
taxpayer presents at least one appraiser.

H7 :

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS when the Service has
at least one appraiser testify.

H8 :

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer’s value when
multiple tax years are involved.

H9 :

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter.

Hypotheses - Behavioral Portion
The following hypotheses are also drawn from the preceding research questions
and are in their alternate form belonging to the behavioral portion.
H 10: Male (female) judges grant higher compensation to male (female) taxpayers when
compared to female (male) judges when the outcome of the case is protaxpayer.
Hi 1: Female (male) judges agree more with an unfavorable outcome when dealing with
male (female) taxpayers.
H 12:

Conservative (liberal) judges agree more with favorable (unfavorable) outcomes
than liberal (conservative) judges.

H13: A judge having at least one daughter agrees more with a decision of an unfavorable
outcome for the taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least one daughter.
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Hh:

A judge having at least one daughter agrees more with a decision with a favorable
outcome for a female taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least one daughter.

Survey Instrument - Behavioral Portion
The behavioral portion of this study involves the use of two survey vignettes. The
first survey vignette bears a slight resemblance to the case Universal Marketing, Inc. v.
Commissioner, TC Memo 2007-305 as a model for the creation of the scenario. However,
the name of the corporation is changed along with the numbers representing salary, gross
receipts, and total income. The five factors used by the court to determine reasonableness
of compensation and the evidence ruling in favor of the taxpayer or the IRS are very
similar. This case was chosen as a template because the court rendered a decision declaring
the amount allowed by the Service as the reasonable amount. Thirty-two questions were
then provided to the participant regarding how they would decide, why they would decide,
and some demographic/professional qualification questions. Furthermore, three different
survey vignettes emerged from the first survey vignette. One vignette will describe a male
taxpayer, the second a female taxpayer, and last a genderless taxpayer. The following
represents the scenario in the first vignette:
John (or Mary), who is a taxpayer, works for a business named International Design
(ID). ID does not have a compensation policy and pays bonuses to employees at the
end of the year once the amount of cash available is determined.
•

ID is a closely held company that provides printing, marketing, and advertising
activities

•

ID reported gross receipts of $ 1,583,149.50
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•

When added with gross rents and gross royalties, the total income for ID was
$1,715,202

•

ID paid compensation amounting to a $40,000 salary and a $500,000 bonus to
Mary

• No dividends were paid that year
• Mary was president, secretary, and treasurer
• Mary was responsible for handling all of ID’s managerial duties
• A specific item of time spent with ID was disclosed as 80% o f Mary’s time and
evidence was found that Mary spent 20% of the remaining time with ID’s sister
corporation
•

No evidence was provided by the corporation identifying a comparison of paid
compensation to other companies providing similar services

ID has the following information regarding its operations:
•

ID paid total wages of approximately $635,000, of which $540,000 were paid to
Mary and $95,000 were paid to all other employees

•

ID is a small company with not very extensive operations

•

ID had a return on equity of 42% which more than satisfied a hypothetical
independent investor test

•

ID was thinly capitalized

•

ID had equipment with a fair market value of $80,332.50

OUTCOME: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon receiving ID’s tax return
deems $150,000 in compensation as reasonable for Mary. Thereby, the IRS
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disallowed $390,000 of Mary's compensation. Factors commonly considered by the
courts are:
•

character and condition of the company

•

comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income

•

comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders

•

compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years

•

conflict of interest

•

employee’s qualifications

•

nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work

•

prevailing general economic conditions

•

prevailing rates o f compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns

•

salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees

•

scarcity of qualified employees

•

taxpayer’s role in the company
The second survey vignette parallels the case Universal Marketing, Inc. v.

Commissioner, TC Memo 2007-305 as a template for the establishment of the scenario.
The name of the corporation is modified in addition to switching the numbers used as
salary, gross receipts, and total income. The five factors acknowledged by the court in
figuring reasonable compensation and the evidence favoring the taxpayer or the IRS are
comparable. This second vignette is manipulated by switching the last sentence in the first
paragraph of the vignette so that more evidence favors the taxpayer. Thirty-two questions
were once again provided to the participant regarding how they would decide, why they
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would decide, and some demographic/professional qualification questions. Additionally,
two different survey vignettes will emerge from the second survey vignette depicting either
a male taxpayer or a female taxpayer. The following represents the scenario in the second
vignette:
John (or Mary), who is a taxpayer, works for a business named International Design
(ID). ID does have a compensation policy and pays bonuses based on the employee's
individual performance. This policy was the same for all employees and originated
from a bonus plan voted on and approved by the board of directors at the beginning of
the year.
•

ID is a closely held company that provides printing, marketing, and advertising
activities

•

ID reported gross receipts of $1,583,149.50

•

When added with gross rents and gross royalties, the total income for ID was
$1,715,202

•

ID paid compensation amounting to a $40,000 salary and a $500,000 bonus to Mary

•

No dividends were paid that year

•

Mary was president, secretary, and treasurer

•

Mary was responsible for handling all of ID’s managerial duties

•

A specific item of time spent with ID was disclosed as 80% of Mary’s time and
evidence was found that Mary spent 20% of the remaining time with ID’s sister
corporation

•

No evidence was provided by the corporation identifying a comparison o f paid
compensation to other companies providing similar services
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ID has the following information regarding its operations:
•

ID paid total wages of approximately $635,000, of which $540,000 were paid to
Mary and $95,000 were paid to all other employees

• ID is a small company with not very extensive operations
•

ID had a return on equity of 42% which more than satisfied a hypothetical
independent investor test

•

ID was thinly capitalized

•

ID had equipment with a fair market value of $80,332.50

OUTCOME: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon receiving ID’s tax return deems
$150,000 in compensation as reasonable for Mary.

Thereby, the IRS disallowed

$390,000 o f Mary's compensation. Factors commonly considered by the courts are:
•

character and condition of the company

•

comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income

•

comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders

•

compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years

•

conflict o f interest

•

employee’s qualifications

•

nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work

•

prevailing general economic conditions

•

prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns

•

salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees

•

scarcity of qualified employees

•

taxpayer’s role in the company
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The experimental design for the behavioral portion is a 2 (taxpayer’s gender:
male/female) X 2 (favorableness: taxpayer win/IRS win) X 2 (participant’s gender:
male/female) between subject full factorial design. Thus, the first factor represents two
levels when the taxpayer is either male or female. The second factor represents two levels
where there is either an IRS win or taxpayer win. The third factor in the experiment
represents the participant’s gender which was either male or female. The population for
the behavioral portion of this study was 302 CPAs.

Subjects
Since tax professionals’ perceptions of reasonable compensation and gender are
being evaluated, certified public accountants (CPAs) are needed for this study. Qualtrics
was selected to find the survey participants and administer the survey. Qualtrics awarded
the subjects according to their compensation policies.

Case Selection
The archival portion of this study analyzed reasonable compensation cases. The
time span studied includes cases decided during the period of 1983-2014. The cases were
collected from Research Institute of America (RIA). The method of finding the reasonable
compensation cases involved searching the RIA database for the keywords “reasonable
compensation.” Next, each case summary was read by the researcher and specific items
were identified from Tax Court opinions. The variables extracted from each summary
opinion were judge making the ruling, the taxpayer, the amount claimed/deducted by the
taxpayer/corporation, the amount allowed by the IRS, the amount deemed reasonable by
the court, whether or not the taxpayer had an expert witness/appraiser, whether or not the
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IRS had an expert witness/appraiser, and the number of tax years decided by the court in
the case. Because political affiliation is also investigated in this study, the appointing
president was identified. The presidents responsible for appointing the tax court judges
include Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, George H.W.
Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. On numerous occasions, the court ruled on more than
one year for more than one taxpayer. In these instances, each year and each taxpayer
constituted a single observation. Therefore, one case could have multiple taxpayer genders
and taxpayer decisions for both the taxpayer and the Service.
Numerous electronic sources (i.e., http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/022304.pdf.
http://ustaxcourt.gov/press/011702.pdf. to name a few) were used to identify the family
composition o f the judges.

Tax C ourt Decisions - Archival Portion
Research Question 1
Is there a significant difference in how male and female judges render a
reasonable compensation decision?
The following areas have been studied trying to find a difference between males
and females: valuation in estate tax cases (Pippin et al. 2014), innocent spouse relief (Pierce
et al. 2013), differences in ideology (Norrander and Wilcox 2008), differences in culture
(Roxas and Stoneback 2004), hiring decisions (Segal 2000), voting patterns (Songer and
Crews-Meyer 2000; Songer etal. 1994; Welch 1985; Gruhl etal. 1981), ethical judgments
(Smith and Rogers 2000; Cohen et al. 1998), identifying a “just society” (Prasad et al.
1998), ethical behaviors (Smith and Oakley 1997), decisions in arbitration (Bemmels
1988), and employee evaluation (Oliphant and Alexander 1982; Rose and Andiappan
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1978). Results have been mixed and, therefore, provide an area for further research. Prior
studies lead to the subsequent hypothesis Hi:
H i:

There is a statistically significant difference between male and female judge
decisions in reasonable compensation cases.
This hypothesis will be measured using a Chi-Square test to determine if the

difference is statistically significant.

Research Question 2
Do judges simply come to a “Compromise ” decision, represented as the arithmetic
mean, when deciding a reasonable compensation case?
In Englebrecht (1976), the author examined how judges value closely held stock.
This study’s objective was to determine whether the judges approached each case
objectively using the facts and circumstances of the case or assumed the role as
arbitrator/compromiser in estate and gift tax cases. The computed R2 in the Englebrecht
(1976) study was 97.49%. This high coefficient of determination in gift and estate tax
cases heard in the U.S. Tax Court suggest judges may not give much weight to the
information presented by both parties (taxpayer and IRS). At this time, estate and gift taxes
were minor revenue raisers, however, when they were applicable, they presented an
oppressive decedent’s tax burden with rates as high as 77% with a limited 50% marital
deduction. Therefore, the estate could place undue hardship on surviving spouses. On the
other hand, the Englebrecht and Jamison (1979) study examined whether a “compromiser
model” was used by the Tax Court when deciding charitable contribution property
valuations. The conclusions showed the Tax Court did not rule in a compromising manner
providing evidence that for the big revenue raisers, the court appears to go the extra mile
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to determine the “true value.” Moreover, the Court seemed to evaluate each case on its
own merit assigning an equitable and fair value based on the evidence and details of each
case. Most recently, the Jackson et al. (2013) article investigated the court’s role in asset
and business valuation from a perspective of estate taxes. The main issue addressed was
how the court valued the issues brought by the taxpayer and the Service (IRS). The main
outcome from this article advocated even though the court’s verdict and the mean between
the taxpayer’s and IRS claimed figures are exceedingly correlated, the court does not
simply split the disputed amounts at the mean. These mixed conclusions lead to the
following hypothesis H2 :
H2 :

The “Compromise” amount (arithmetic mean) will be significant in
explaining the Court’s determined figure.
A simple ordinary least squares regression will be utilized to answer this research

question.
Research Question 3
Are male judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount o f compensation
fo r the taxpayer than female judges?
Critical mass theory is described in Kanter (1977). Specifically, the article posits
that no difference will exist between the dominant group which in this study is male judges
and the token group represented by female judges. Accordingly, this theory predicts no
differences in how male and female judges make decisions. In Welch (1985), the authors
found that females rule less conservatively than males in Congress. When examining a tax
issue, a conservative approach has been known to favor the taxpayer and a liberal decision
the govemment/IRS. Since females tend to be more liberal, then it would seem that females
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would lean toward deciding in favor of the govemment/IRS and males should rule for the
taxpayer. Additional evidence exists in Walker and Barrow (1985) where the authors also
concluded that female judges deferred to the governmental position. More recently, in
Pippin et al. (2014), male judges favored the taxpayer and female judges favored the
government. Also, Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000) showed females vote more liberally
than males on death penalty and obscenity cases. These consistent findings across the
empirical studies lead to the following hypothesis H3 :
H3 :

Male judges are more likely to rule for higher amounts o f compensation than
female judges.
This research question will be answered through the use of ordinary least squares

to determine a specific difference in percent ruled for. Logit will also be included in the
analysis to determine a probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s
amount by a male judge compared to a female judge.

Research Question 4
Are judges more likely to decide on a higher amount o f compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge (male/male or female/female)?
Social identity theory discussed in Tajfel and Turner (1979) targets intergroup
relations. Tajfel and Turner (1979) posit the existence of in-group favoritism and out
group discrimination. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), male judges will show
favoritism to individuals in their in-group or the male taxpayer. Also, female judges will
display preferential treatment to their in-group of female taxpayers. On the other hand,
each gender will discriminate against the opposing gender. A recent empirical article
providing evidence for social identity theory is Pierce et al. (2013). This article revealed
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males grant equitable relief at a higher rate when the requesting spouse is male. On the
other hand, literature providing contrary evidence to social identity theory includes Hardin
et al. (2002), Segal (2000), Bemmels (1988), and Gruhl et al. (1981). Hardin et al. (2002)
presented evidence that female recruiters offered male recruits higher salaries than female
recruits. The results of Segal (2000) suggest judges do not make decisions specifically for
their respective groups. In the Bemmels (1988) article, females receive better treatment
than males when dealing with a male arbitrator. Last, Gruhl et al. (1981) provides support
that female judges have a higher probability of sentencing female defendants than male
judges. The mixed results in intergroup relations suggest that more research is needed.
Following, social identity theory and more recent literature leads to hypothesis H3a and
H3b :

H3a:

Male judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when the
taxpayer is a male opposed to a female taxpayer.

H3 b:

Female judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when
the taxpayer is female compared to a male taxpayer.
This research question will be examined through the use of ordinary least squares

to find a difference in percent decided. Logit will be used to calculate a probability of
selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s amount by the different combinations of
male and female judges and taxpayers.
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Research Question 5
Are male taxpayers more likely to receive a higher amount o f compensation than
female taxpayers?
Mixed results have surrounded which gender receives preferential treatment when
compared against one another. Hardin et al. (2002), in the recruiting arena, illustrated that
male recruits obtain higher salary offers than female recruits. However, Bemmels (1988)
provides evidence that females receive favorable treatment over males in the arbitration
forum.

In the Jackson et al. (1985) article, feminine coworkers were awarded more

generous allocations than masculine coworkers. This mixed line of research leads to the
following hypothesis:
H4 :

Male taxpayers are more likely to receive a decision of higher compensation than
female taxpayers.
The research question will be measured with OLS. Also, through the use of logit,

a probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s amount with a male
taxpayer compared to a female taxpayer will be computed.

Research Questions 6, 7, 8, and 9
Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer than a judge selected by a Democratic president?
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer when the
taxpayer presents at least one appraiser?
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IRS when the IRS
chooses to have at least one appraiser?
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Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer’s claimed
value when multiple tax years are involved?
Jackson et al. (2013) examined estate tax cases and business and asset valuation.
This study resulted in four significant variables in combined cases.

These variables

included number of taxpayer appraisers, political affiliation, type of asset, and
age/complexity of the case. The authors, using a correlation matrix, found a negative and
significant association between the ScaledDiff number and the variables of Republican, TP
appraisers, business property, and case age. The ScaledDiff variable represented the court
value minus the mean value of the taxpayer and IRS’s value. A negative association would
indicate a decision in favor of the taxpayer. Because of the nature of this study, the business
property significance does not have a corresponding hypothesis.

Also, the variable

CaseAge in the Jackson et al. (2013) study is replaced in the current study with a variable
representing a case that spans multiple years. This multiple years variable has been added
because of the docket load associated with U.S. Tax Court judges. Many cases are litigated
in this tax forum. Therefore, if the docket load is large and judges strive to efficiently and
effectively rule, then a multiple tax year case may be decided in an accelerated manner
toward the taxpayer or Service. Additionally, the Howard (2007) article found taxpayers
litigate in the U.S. Tax Court because they believe that arena is more conservative.
Thereby, a multiple year case may favor the taxpayer. This rationale leads to the following
four hypotheses Hs-Hs:
Hs:

Judges appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability of ruling in
favor of the taxpayer than a judge named by a Democratic president.
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H6:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer when the
taxpayer presents at least one appraiser.

H7 :

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS when the Service has
at least one appraiser.

Hs:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer’s value when
multiple tax years are involved.
These research questions will be evaluated through the use of OLS to determine a

specific difference in percent ruled for in the tax decisions. Using logit in addition to
ordinary least squares, a probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s
amount by political affiliation, either the taxpayer or the Service having at least one
appraiser, and the amount of tax years will be calculated.

Research Question 10
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IR S’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter?
The last hypothesis was generated from the Glynn and Sen (2015) article published
in the American Journal o f Political Science. This article targeted judicial empathy and
concluded judges are affected by personal experiences and relationships. The findings
show a judge with at least one daughter has a higher likelihood of deciding in a liberal
direction. This article result leads to the following hypothesis:
H9 :

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter.
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This research question will be addressed through OLS. Logit will be implemented
to determine a probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s amount by a
judge with no daughters compared to a judge with at least one daughter.

Models - Archival Portion
Chi-Square Test - Archival
Chi-square is defined as a statistical difference measure that compares the
estimated and observed covariance matrices. Furthermore, this test has been described as
the “only measure that has a direct statistical test as to its significance and it forms the
basis for many other goodness-of-fit measures” (Hair et al. 2006, p. 706). The Chi-Square
test will be the first test used to determine if there is a statistically significant difference
between male and female judges and whether the U.S. Tax Court rules closer to the
taxpayers deducted (claimed) amount or the IRS’s allowed amount.

Simple Regression/Naive Model - Archival Portion
Multiple models were constructed and examined in this study. The first model was
a simple regression or naive model. A univariate model consists of a single independent
variable and a single dependent variable depicted through the equation below:
Y = b0 + biXx + e
Y= The amount deemed reasonable by the U.S. Tax Court judge.
biXi = The “Compromiser” or “Arbitrator” amount (arithmetic mean between the
taxpayer’s claimed amount and the IRS’s allowed amount).
e

= Error term.
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The Y value equals the dependent variable or the Court determined amount. The X
value represents the independent variable or the “Compromiser”/"Arbitrator” amount. The
bo signifies the y-intercept term if the arithmetic mean equals “0.” The bi is the slope for
each additional increase in one unit of the “Compromiser” or “Arbitrator” amount. In
Englebrecht (1976), the author examined the role judges play in valuing closely held stock.
The purpose of that study was to determine whether the judges objectively approached
each case or assumed the role as arbitrator in estate and gift tax cases. The independent
variable was the arithmetic mean between the IRS’s value and the taxpayer’s value. The
dependent variable was the closely held stock price decided by the Tax Court.
computed R2 in the Englebrecht (1976) study was 97.49%.

The

This high coefficient of

determination in gift and estate tax cases heard in the U.S. Tax Court provides evidence
judges fail to give adequate weight to the facts and circumstances of each case. Using the
Englebrecht (1976) study as a guide, the dependent variable in the current study is the Tax
Court determined dollar amount. The independent variable is the “Compromiser” or
“arbitrator”

amount

calculated by

taking

the

arithmetic

mean

between

the

taxpayer/corporation deducted amount and the amount deemed reasonable or allowed by
the IRS.
Multiple Regression/Ordinary Least Squares - Archival
Naturally, when using statistical analysis containing more than one independent
variable, multiple regression is a popular and useful tool. However, four assumptions must
be met to insure that inferences made are valid. Logistic regression models, on the other
hand, are best suited when predictor variables do not have a normal distribution.
Furthermore, some or all of the independent variables are categorical or discrete (Johnson
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1998). The main difference between logistic regression and multiple regression is the
dependent variable of the logistic regression tends to be binary in nature. The dependent
variable in multiple regression typically is continuous (Johnson 1998). In this study, both
multiple regression and logistic regression or logit will be implemented.

Multiple Regression Model
Multiple regression consists o f a model with more than one independent variable
and a single dependent variable. The form of multivariate regression is depicted below:
Y=
xr

- ti

hg +

b^Xi

+

.

"b

^3 X3

+

b^X^ + b$X$

+

b^X^ + b-jX-j + b$X8

+

e

Court Am ount-IRS Amount
Taxpayer Claimed or Deducted Am ount-IRS Amount

Y= The Court s percent = ----------— -— — -------- —----------— --------biXi = Judge gender dummy variable

I32X2= Judge’s number of daughters variable
b3X3 = Tenure variable (Year decided —year appointed)
b4X4 = Political affiliation dummy variable
bsXs = Number of years decided variable
b6X6 = Taxpayer gender dummy variable
b7X7 = Number of taxpayer appraisers/expert witnesses variable
b8X8 = Number o f IRS appraisers/expert witnesses variable
The multiple regression model included a dependent variable which is a continuous
variable of the Court’s ruled percentage of the amount claimed between the taxpayer and
the IRS. The independent variables consisted of a judge gender dummy variable (JSex), a
judge’s number of daughters variable (ofDaughters), the tenure o f the judge represented by
the difference in years between the deciding of the case and the original appointment o f the
judge (Tenure), a dummy variable of the political party of the president who appointed the
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judge (PoliticalAffiliation), a variable representing the number of tax years the court is
ruling on (NumberofYearsDecided), a taxpayer gender dummy variable (TSex), a variable
representing the number of taxpayer appraisers/expert witnesses (TPApp), and a variable
representing the number of IRS appraisers/expert witnesses (IRSApp).

Coding Method - Archival
The researcher identified the decision rendered as the actual Court decided amount
minus the IRS’s allowed amount divided by the amount claimed by the taxpayer less the
allowable amount given by the Service. The independent variables were coded as follows:
the gender/sex of the judge as a “0” (female) or “1” (male), the judge’s number of daughters
variable, the tenure of the judge (year the decision was issued minus the year the judge was
appointed), the political party of the president who appointed the judge as a “0” (Democrat)
or “ 1” (Republican), the number of tax years being decided in the case, the gender o f the
taxpayer as a “0” (female) or “ 1” (male), the taxpayer’s number of appraisers, and the IRS’s
number of appraisers.

Multiple Logistic Regression/Logit Model - Archival
The multiple logistic regression model included a dependent variable which is a
categorical variable of the winning party. The decision is designated as a “0” if the amount
ruled is greater than the “Compromiser” amount or arithmetic mean and closer to the
taxpayer’s claimed amount. The decision is coded “1” if the amount ruled is equal to or
less than the “Compromiser” amount or arithmetic mean. The independent variables will
consist of a judge gender dummy variable (JSex), a judge’s daughter dummy variable
(Daughter), the tenure o f the judge represented by the difference in years between the

70
deciding of the case and the original appointment of the judge (Tenure), a dummy variable
of the political party of the president who appointed the judge (PoliticalAffiliation), a
dummy variable representing the case as being a single-year decision or a multi-year
decision (Multiyearcase), a taxpayer gender dummy variable (TSex), an interaction
variable of judge gender and taxpayer gender (JSex#TSex), a dummy variable representing
whether or not the taxpayer has at least one appraiser/expert witness (AtLeastOneTPAPP),
and a dummy variable signifying whether or not the IRS has at least one appraiser/expert
witness (AtLeastOnelRSAPP).

Coding Method - Archival
The researcher identified the decision rendered as being closer to the taxpayer’s
amount as a “0” or equal to the mean or closer to the IRS’s allowed amount as a “ 1”. The
gender of the judge was coded as a “0” (female) or “ 1” (male), the judge’s daughter dummy
variable as a “0” (the judge does not have a daughter) or “ 1” (the judge has at least one
daughter), the tenure of the judge (year the decision was issued minus the year the judge is
appointed), the political party of the president who appointed the judge as a “0” (Democrat)
or “ 1” (Republican), a dummy variable representing whether or not the case involved a
single tax year or multiple tax years with a single tax year case coded as a “0” and a
multiyear case coded as a “1”, the gender of the taxpayer as a “0” (female) or “1” (male),
the interaction of judge’s gender and taxpayer’s gender, the taxpayer’s number of
appraisers as a “0” (no appraisers) or “ 1” (1 or more appraisers), and the IRS’s number of
appraisers as a “0” (no appraisers) or “ 1” (1 or more appraisers).
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Surveys - Behavioral Portion
The behavioral portion of this study is assessed through the use of two survey
vignettes portraying a reasonable compensation case. The first vignette described an IRS
win situation varied the taxpayer’s gender. The genders were male, female, or unknown.
The second vignette will vary slightly with a different last sentence depicting a taxpayer
win. Also, the genders were male, female, or unknown.

Models - Behavioral Portion
Chi-Square Test - Behavioral
Chi-square is defined as a statistical difference measure that compares the estimated
and observed covariance matrices. Furthermore, this test has been described as the “only
measure that has a direct statistical test as to its significance and it forms the basis for many
other goodness-of-fit measures” (Hair et al. 2006, p. 706). The Chi-Square test will be
used several times to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the
different groups discussed below.

Analysis o f Variance - Behavioral
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is described as a “statistical technique used to
determine whether samples from two or more groups come from populations with equal
means” (Hair et al., p. 384). Specific groups will be identified using the survey vignettes.
These groups consisted of males and females, conservative and liberals, and judges with
or without daughters. Running ANOVA will then determine if a statistically significant
different exists between the groups.
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Research Question 4
Are judges more likely to decide on a higher amount o f compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge (male/male or female/female)?
Social identity theory discussed in Tajfel and Turner (1979) describes in-group
favoritism and out-group discrimination. The groups in this study are males and females.
In-group would depict a situation of a male judge deciding on a male taxpayer and female
judge rendering a decision on a female taxpayer. Out-group would consist of a male judge
and a female taxpayer and vice versa. Since, Tajfel and Turner (1979) posit in-group
favoritism, a male taxpayer would receive preferential treatment from a male judge.
Additionally, a female taxpayer would experience similar treatment from a female judge.
On the other hand, a female judge would rule more harshly toward a male taxpayer and a
male judge would act the same with a female taxpayer. An empirical study that exhibits
results aligned with social identity theory is Pierce et al. (2013). In that study addressing
innocent spouse relief, males grant equitable relief more when the requesting spouse is
male.

Studies providing opposite results include Hardin et al. (2002), Segal (2000),

Bemmels (1988), and Gruhl et al. (1981). Hardin et al. (2002) found higher salaries were
offered to males over females by female recruiters. Segal (2000) concluded that judges do
not provide policy representation to their respective groups. The admission of African
Americans and women were specifically studied in this article comparing them to whites
and males. In the Bemmels (1988) article, male arbitrators gave favorable treatment to
females over males. Last, the results in Gruhl et al. (1981) indicated female judges have a
higher likelihood of sentencing female defendants than male judges. These studies lead to
the following hypotheses Hio and Hu:
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Hio:

Male (female) judges give favorable compensation to male (female) taxpayers
when compared to female (male) judges when the outcome of the case is
protaxpayer.

Hi i:

Female (male) judges agree more with unfavorable outcomes when dealing with
male (female) taxpayers.
This research question will be assessed by running an ANOVA and Chi-Square

Test to determine if a difference exists between the specified parties. Logit also will be
implemented to determine the probability o f selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the
IRS’s amount by a male judge and a female judge.

Research Question 6
Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer than a judge selected by a Democratic president?
Jackson et al. (2013) examined business and asset valuation in estate tax cases.
Four significant variables were found in the study.
political affiliation.

Among these variables included

The authors found an association both negative and significant

between the ScaledDiffvariable and the variable of Republican using a correlation matrix.
The court value minus the mean value of the taxpayer and IRS’s value constituted the
ScaledDiff variable. A negative association, therefore, would depict a decision in favor of
the taxpayer. This result leads to hypothesis H 12 described below:
H 12:

Conservative (liberal) judges agree more with favorable (unfavorable) outcomes
for the taxpayer than liberal (conservative) judges.
This research question will be addressed through the use of both an ANOVA and

Chi-Square Tests to determine if a difference exists between the conservative judges and
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the liberal judges. Logit will be implemented to analyze the probability of selecting the
taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s amount by a conservative judge with a liberal judge.

Research Question 10
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IR S’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter?
Based on the Glynn and Sen (2015) article, a judge having at least one daughter
will vote in a more liberal direction. Furthermore, a liberal decision in the U.S. Tax Court
tends to favor the IRS. Additionally, a decision for the Service would be deemed an
unfavorable outcome. This research leads to the following hypothesis:
H 13:

A judge having at least one daughter will agree more with a decision o f an
unfavorable outcome for the taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least one
daughter.
ANOVA and Chi-Square Test will be conducted to determine if a significant

difference exists between judges having at least one daughter and judges without a
daughter. Logit will compute the probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the
IRS’s amount by a judge with at least one daughter and a judge without any daughters.
The last hypothesis is a mixture of the literature presented so far. Social identity
theory highlights in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. Coupled with social
identity theory, Glynn and Sen (2015) found evidence that having a daughter influences an
individual to make decisions in a more liberal direction. Also, females have been shown
to be more liberal. Therefore, an individual who has a daughter is going to vote similarly
to a female and will show a female taxpayer more favor than a male taxpayer. The ensuing
hypothesis describes this situation:
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Hu:

A judge having at least one daughter will agree more with a decision with a
favorable outcome for a female taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least
one daughter.
The difference will be evaluated after calculating an ANOVA and Chi-Square Test

between judges having at least one daughter and judges not having at least one daughter in
rendering a decision for a female taxpayer. Additional analysis will be done with logit to
determine the probability of selecting the taxpayer’s amount over the IRS’s amount by a
judge with at least one daughter with a judge that does not have at least one daughter when
deciding a female taxpayer’s case.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS
The objective of this chapter is to explain the results of the data analysis.
Descriptive statistics are discussed first for the archival portion, then results are addressed
through the research questions for the analysis of U.S. Tax Court judicial decisions. Next,
descriptive statistics are revealed for the behavioral portion examining CPAs and their
decision-making, followed by an interpretation and discussion of the results. Also, a
connection is made with prior studies supporting or failing to support previous findings.

Archival Portion

Descriptive Statistics - Gender, Political Affiliation, Tenure, Etc.
Data
The time span studied included cases decided during the period of 1983-2014. The
decisions were collected from Research Institute of America (RIA). The method used to
find the cases involved searching the RIA database using the keywords “reasonable
compensation.” Each judicial holding was read by the researcher and specific items were
identified from each case. The number of observations totaled 240 observations from 88
U.S. Tax Court cases. The number of judges included in the sample was 37. Of the 37
judges, 30 of the judges were male while seven of the judges were female. The seven
female judges accounted for 80 of the observations.
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This means 30 male judges accounted for the other 160 observations.

The

presidents responsible for appointing the tax court judges included Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W.
Bush. On numerous occasions, the court ruled on more than one tax year for more than
one taxpayer.
In these specific instances, each year and each taxpayer constituted a single
observation. Therefore, one case could have multiple taxpayer genders and taxpayer
holdings.
Additionally, the focus of this study was closely held corporations. To address this
specific area, only businesses described in the following manner were kept: two controlling
shareholder-employees, 50% owned by shareholder/president and 50% owned by
shareholder/wife, all stock owned by husband and wife, CEO was 99% shareholder of
subsidiary’s parent, CEO majority shareholder, closely held, closely held corporation,
closely owned, controlling officer-shareholders, each individual owned 50% o f the
business, family-owned, five shareholders, founding shareholder, officer-shareholder, only
shareholders/brothers, owned by three individuals, owned substantially all o f the
corporation, owner owned all of the stock, owner-manager and son-in-law manager,
owner-officer, paid to its shareholders based on stock ownership, president/majority
shareholder, president - two shareholders, president /indirect sole shareholder, president
and sole shareholder, president/chief stockholder, president/indirect shareholder, president
majority shareholder, principal stockholder-CEO, private foundation, S corporation,
shareholder-employee of professional corporation, shareholder-employee, shareholder’s
son, sole officer and shareholder, sole proprietor, sole shareholder and partnership, sole
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shareholder/president/CEO, sole stockholder, solely owned, stock owned by four people,
taxpayer-corporation’s president and vice president, wholly-owned corporation, wife of
corporation’s sole shareholder, and wife of sole stockholder (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1
Other Descriptive Statistics fo r Archival Portion

Number of Tax
Years Decided
Allowed Percent
o f 100
Tenure

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

240

1.0

8.0

2.825

1.6925

240

0

100

44.98

39.798

240

1.0

35.0

12.404

8.6619

Table 4.1 shows the mean number of tax years decided per reasonable
compensation case at 2.83 tax years. Additionally, the average percent of compensation
allowed of the disallowed amount is 44.98%. This figure is high and would intrigue a lot
of taxpayers to consider litigating if any part of their compensation is disallowed. Last, the
mean years of experience a judge has with the U.S. Tax Court, based on original
appointment, when hearing a case is 12.4 years o f experience.

Research Question 1
Is there a significant difference in how male andfemale judges render a
reasonable compensation decision?
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Chi-Square Test Results - Archival
Table 4.2 illustrates the results of running the Chi-Square test between male and
female judges. O f the 240 total observations, 80 of the decisions were made by a female
judge and 160 decisions by male judges.

Table 4.2
Chi-Square Results Between Gender

Judge Sex
Female
Male
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 39.2509

Closer to the Taxipayer or IRS
Taxpayer
IRS
9
71
85
75
94
146
Pr = 0.000

Total
80
160
240

The p-value from running the Chi-Square test was 0.000. This computed p-value
indicates there is a statistically significant difference between how male and female judges
rule in deciding a case for the taxpayer (amount granted greater than the “Compromise”
value) or the IRS (amount granted less than or equal to the “Compromise” value).
Additionally, this result gives evidence to continue with the study of judge sex in the
subsequent models and provides support for Hi. The finding of a difference in gender
supports Prasad et al. (1998) and Schminke (1997). Prasad et al. (1998) concluded a gender
effect between individuals evaluating a “just society.” Schminke (1997) also revealed
gender differences existed when studying a subject’s reaction o f others’ ethical dilemmas.
Moreover, an ANOVA was run to determine if a significant difference existed based on
the percent allowed of the total disallowed amount by a male judge and a female judge.
Table 4.3 illustrates the average awarded percent of disallowed compensation.
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Table 4.3
Mean Percent Allowed o f Male and Female Judges Deciding Cases in the U.S. Tax Court
Judge Sex
Female
Male
Total

Mean
22.26
56.33
44.98

Std. Deviation
26.761
40.443
39.798

N
80
160
240

An ANOVA was calculated to determine if the means were significantly different.
Table 4.4 depicts the results of the ANOVA based on U.S. Tax Court judge gender.

Table 4.4
Results o f Running an ANOVA Between Male and Female U.S. Tax Court Judges
Type III Sum of
Squares

Source
df
Mean Square
Corrected
61917.294®
1
61917.294
Model
Intercept
329434.192
1
329434.192
Judge Sex
61917.294
1
61917.294
Error
238
316636.597
1330.406
Total
864022.338
240
Corrected Total
378553.892
239
a. R Squared = .164 (Adjusted R Squared = .161y)

F

Sig.

46.540

.000

247.619
46.540

.000
.000

The findings from the ANOVA show a strong statistical difference between the
percent of the disallowed amount deemed allowable by a female judge (22.26%) and a
male judge (56.33%) with a p-value of 0.000. This highly significant difference warrants
further examination into the deviation of decision-making in the U.S. Tax Court.
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Research Question 2
Do judges simply come to a “Compromise ” decision, represented as the
arithmetic mean between the amount claimed by the taxpayer and the amount
allowed by the IRS, when deciding a reasonable compensation decision?

Simple Regression/Naive Model Results -A rchival
The next part of this study used a naive model to determine if the “Arbitrator” or
“Compromiser” amount significantly explained the number derived by the judge in the
U.S. Tax Court. The “Compromiser” amount was the independent variable represented as
the arithmetic mean between the claimed amount by the taxpayer and the allowed amount
by the IRS. The dependent variable was the actual dollar amount determined by the U.S.
Tax Court (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5
Simple Regression Results from Court Amount and Compromise Value
Court
Amount
Compromiser
Value
Intercept

Coefficient

t

P>|t|

1.42791

Robust Std.
Error
0.381151

3.75

0

0.6770492

2.17877

-295,915.10

211,233.40

-1.4

0.163

-712,041

120,210.80

[95% Conf. Interval]

The overall model is statistically significant with a p-value o f 0.0002. The R2 is
0.7934. This means that the “Compromiser” or “Arbitrator” amount explains 79.34% of
the variation in the amount deemed reasonable by the judge. This number is very high but
not high enough to suggest the judge does not weigh the facts and circumstances o f the
case.

Additionally, the p-value of the “Compromiser” variable is 0.000.

Since the

“Compromiser” model is significant, this provides support for H2 . This result aligns with
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Jackson et al. (2013) which affirmed that the court does not use a “Compromise” model in
U.S. Tax Court and District Courts. Specifically, support is provided for Englebrecht and
Jamison (1979) indicating each income tax case is determined on its own merit.

Multiple Regression/Ordinary Least Squares Results -Archival
Next, this study examined the decision rendered in terms of percentage allowed of
the disputed amount (taxpayer claimed amount - IRS allowed amount). This part is
interesting because as one unit is added to the different independent variables, the multiple
regression/OLS model allows the researchers to see the direct impact on the decision
rendered by the judge on the U.S. Tax Court (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with Allowed Amount as Percent o f 100 o f
Disallowed Amount
Allowed Amount
as Percent o f 100
Judge Sex
Number of
Daughters
Tenure
Political
Affiliation
Number of Years
Decided
Taxpayer Sex
Number of
Taxpayer
Appraisers
Number of IRS
Appraisers
Intercept

Coefficient

Robust Std.
Error

t

P>|t|

31.90988

4.388995

7.27

0.000

23.2623

40.55746

0.8224883

2.43408

0.34

0.736

-3.973346

5.618323

-0.5293153

0.2536465

-20.9

0.038

-1.029072

-0.2095589

3.927222

8.550331

0.46

0.646

-12.91938

20.77383

-8.266022

1.132516

-7.3

0.000

-10.4974

-6.03464

10.76669

5.617658

1.92

0.057

-0.3017062

21.83509

4.383818

3.354757

1.31

0.193

-2.226016

10.99365

5.657033

3.704058

1.53

0.128

-1.641023

12.95509

31.65067

11.44305

2.77

0.006

9.104586

54.19676

[95% Conf. Intervall

The overall fit of this model is statistically significant with a p-value o f 0.0000.
The R2 is 0.2930. This means that the eight independent variables included in this model
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explain 29.30% of the variation in the decision rendered by the judge. The statistically
significant independent variables consisted of judge’s sex, tenure, number of years decided,
and taxpayer’s sex.

The p-value of judge’s gender was 0.000 indicating statistical

significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels with a coefficient of 31.90988.
This coefficient amount suggests as the sex of the judge switches from being a female to a
male, the amount considered reasonable by the court increases by 31.9099%. This result
is very similar to the ANOVA results depicted in Table 4.3 indicating male judges hold
reasonable compensation to be nearly 34% higher than female judges. These conclusions
provide support for Pippin et al. (2014), Norrander and Wilcox (2008), Songer and CrewsMeyer (2000), Walker and Barrow (1985), and Welch (1985).

Pippin et al. (2014)

conceded male judges tend to render decisions in the taxpayer’s favor when valuing estates.
Norrander and Wilcox (2008) showed males become more conservative and Republican
over time.

Walker and Barrow (1985) found that females support the government’s

position and Welch (1985) indicated that women vote more liberally. The p-value of tenure
is 0.038 exhibiting statistical significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 significance levels with a
coefficient of -0.529. This coefficient figure implies as the judge gains more experience,
the amount considered reasonable by the court decreases by 0.529% per additional year of
experience. The p-value of number of tax years decided is 0.000 signifying statistical
significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 significance levels with a coefficient of -8.266. This
coefficient number means as the case involves more than one tax year, the amount
considered reasonable by the court decreases by 8.266% per year involved in the case. This
finding provides opposite support from Pippin et al. (2014) which showed the complexity
and age of the case determined by the courts played a significant role in the judge’s
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decisions. The p-value of taxpayer’s sex is 0.057 exhibiting statistical significance at the
0.10 significance level and marginal significance at the 0.05 level with a coefficient of
10.767. This coefficient figure reveals as the taxpayer switches from being a female to a
male, the amount considered reasonable by the court increases by 10.767%. The taxpayer
gender significance substantiates the conclusions reached in Hardin et al. (2002) that male
recruits were awarded higher salaries than female recruits.
significant for taxpayers contemplating litigation.

These findings are very

Additionally, the current study is

focusing on the income tax, which is a huge revenue raiser for the government. Whereas
past studies have concentrated on estate tax accounting for a very small portion of
government revenue.

Meeting the Assumptions
Table 4.7 illustrates the results adjusted using a robustness test and identifies the
robust standard errors for each independent variable.
Table 4.7
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results with Allowed Amount as Percent o f 100 o f
Disallowed Amount with Robust Standard Errors
Allowed Amount as
Percent o f 100

Coefficient

Robust Std.
Error

t

P>|t|

Judge Sex

31.90988

4.388995

7.27

Number of Daughters

0.8224883

2.43408

0.34

Tenure

-0.5293153

0.2536465

-20.9

3.927222

8.550331

0.46

0.000
0.736
0.038
0.646

-8.266022

1.132516

-7.3

Political Affiliation
Number of Years
Decided

f95% Conf. Interval!
23.2623

40.55746

-3.973346

5.618323

-1.029072

-0.2095589

-12.91938

20.77383

0.000

-10.4974

-6.03464

Taxpayer Sex
Number of Taxpayer
Appraisers
Number of IRS
Appraisers

10.76669

5.617658

1.92

0.057

-0.3017062

21.83509

4.383818

3.354757

1.31

0.193

-2.226016

10.99365

5.657033

3.704058

1.53

0.128

-1.641023

12.95509

Intercept

31.65067

11.44305

2.77

0.006

9.104586

54.19676
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Multicollinearity is the next assumption to address since many of the independent
variables may be highly correlated based on similar coding of the measures. Table 4.8
illustrates the computation of Variance Inflation Factors (referred to as VIFs).

Table 4.8
Variance Inflation Factors fo r OLS Model Addressing Multicollinearity
OLS Variables
Number of IRS Appraisers
Number of Taxpayer Appraisers
Judge Sex
Number of Years Decided
Tenure
Number of Daughters
Political Affiliation
Taxpayer Sex

VIF
1.41
1.38
1.29
1.20
1.19
1.12
1.09
1.06

1/VIF
0.711697
0.722405
0.775154
0.830469
0.841641
0.890372
0.915431
0.939281

Based on the mean VIF figure of 1.22, there does not appear to be any
multicollinearity since thSe general rule of thumb is 10 or greater suggest multicollinearity.
This 1.22 number is very important since a large number of the independent variables are
coded “0” and “ 1”. Because multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem, the
inferences taken from running the OLS seem to be valid.

Multiple Logistic Regression Results
Table 4.9 summarizes the results of running multiple logistic regression and will
be used to run margins and predict probability.
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Table 4.9
Logistic Regression Results with a Binary Dependent Variable o f Closer to the Taxpayer
or IRS
Coefficient

Standard
Error

z

P>|z|

Judge Sex

-1.915948

0.4492014

-4.27

Number of Daughters

-0.0672168

0.1632682

-0.41

Tenure

0.0196014

0.0213324

0.92

Political Affiliation

-0.6540848

0.4851294

-1.35

Number of Years Decided
Taxpayer Sex

0.3509333

0.1175577

2.99

-0.1904989

0.4723572

-0.40

0.000
0.681
0.358
0.178
0.003
0.687

0
0
0
0

Empty

Omitted

Number of Taxpayer Appraisers

-0.0456372

0.2317017

-0.20

0.844

Number of IRS Appraisers

-0.1012684

0.2553626

-0.4

0.692

-0.60177

0.3992331

1.536521

0.9310881

1.65

0.099

-0.2883779

3.36142

Closer to Taxpayer or IRS

[95% Conf. Intervall
-2.796366

-1.035529

-0.3872167

0.252783

0.0222094 0.0614121
-1.604921

0.2967513

0.1205244 0.5813421
-1.116302

0.7353042

Judge Sex/Taxpayer Sex Interaction
Female Judge/Female Taxpayer
Female Judge/Male Taxpayer
Male Judge/Female Taxpayer
Male Judge/Male Taxpayer

Intercept

Omitted
Omitted

-0.4997642 0.4084898

Table 4.10 depicts probability a decision will be made equal to the Compromiser
amount or less depending on the independent variable selected.
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Table 4.10
Results o f Running Margin Commands ofJudge and Taxpayer Gender Following
Logistic Regression
Variable

Margin

Delta-method
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

11.78

0.000

0.3938319

0.5510986

17.6

0.000

0.5048102

0.6313283

[95% Conf. Interval]

Judge Sex
Female

(not estimable)

Male

0.4724653

0.0401198

Taxpayer Sex
Female

(not estimable)

Male

0.5680693

Judge Sex/Taxpayer Sex
Interaction
Female Judge/Female
Taxpayer

0.0322756

(not estimable)

Female Judge/Male Taxpayer

0.8428244

0.0503794

16.73

0.000

0.7440826

0.9415663

Male Judge/Female Taxpayer

0.5117243

0.1017622

5.03

0.000

0.312274

0.7111746

Male Judge/Male Taxpayer

0.4678073

0.0428207

10.92

0.000

0.3838802

0.5517344

Using the Logit margin command, the results indicate if the distribution of the
decisions made remains the same in the population, but every judge was male, one would
anticipate about 47% of the decisions made by a male judge would have an outcome where
the court decides a compensation amount equal to the “Compromiser” amount or less. The
gender of male is highly significant with a p-value of 0.000.
Next, the results suggest if the distribution of the decisions made is the same in the
population, but every taxpayer was male, one could predict approximately 57% o f the
decisions made for a male taxpayer would have an outcome where the court decides a
compensation amount equal to or less than the “Compromiser” amount appearing to side
with the IRS. The taxpayer’s sex of male is statistically significant with a p-value o f 0.000.
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Last, the Logit margin command evaluated the interaction of judge gender and
taxpayer gender. The conclusions show if the distribution of the decisions made remains
the same in the population, but every judge and taxpayer was male, one could predict
approximately 46.8% of the decisions made between a male judge and a male taxpayer
would have an outcome where the court decides a compensation amount equal to or less
than the “Compromiser” amount. Furthermore, using the same rationale for female judges
and male taxpayers, one would expect about 84.3% of the decisions made for a male
taxpayer with a rendering by a female judge would have an outcome where the court
decides a compensation amount equal to the “Compromiser” amount or less. With a male
judge and a female taxpayer, one could estimate approximately 51.2% of the decisions
made would have a rendering where the court decides a compensation amount equal to or
less than the mean of the amount claimed by the taxpayer and the amount allowed by the
IRS.

These interaction results are very significant.

All combinations (male/male,

male/female, and female/male) of the sexes are statistically significant with a p-value of
0.000. The results with a male judge support Pierce et al. (2013) which found males
awarded equitable relief more with a male requesting spouse.
One interesting part of the analysis in determining probabilities of the judge’s
decision based on the judge’s sex and the taxpayer’s sex occurred in the situation of a
female judge and a female taxpayer. There were twenty decisions made between a female
judge and a female taxpayer. In all 20 of these holdings, the judge mled equal to the
“Compromiser” amount or less. This is 100% predicted success between a female judge
and a female taxpayer indicating that female judges treat female taxpayers worse than male
taxpayers. This is opposite of what social identity posits. Conversely, the findings when
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the judge was female align with Hardin et al. (2002) which showed that female recruiters
grant larger salaries when evaluating male recruits than female recruits. Specifically, in
the current study, female judges were tougher on female taxpayers deciding on lower
compensation closer to the IRS’s allowed amount. Moreover, this evidence backs Gruhl
et al. (1981) which concluded that women public officials treat females more harshly in
determining a prison sentence.

Research Question 3
Are male judges more likely to rule for a higher amount o f compensation fo r the
taxpayer than female judges?
Using OLS and a dependent variable of “Percent of 100”(court determined amount
- IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS determined amount), the pvalue of the variable judge sex is 0.000 suggesting statistical significance at the 0.10,0.05,
and 0.01 levels with a coefficient of 31.90988. This suggests as the judge switches from
being a female to a male, the “Percent of 100” increases by 31.91% providing strong
evidence for H3. The marginal effects were also calculated using Logit. Using the Logit
margin command with male judges, one could expect about 47.24% of the decisions made
by a male judge would have an outcome where the court decides a compensation amount
equal to 50% between the amount deducted by the taxpayer and the amount allowed by the
IRS or less. The judges’ sex of male is highly significant with a p-value o f 0.000. Female
judges ruled closer to the taxpayer nine out 80 times which makes predicting probabilities
for female judges very difficult and prevents estimation. For male judges, this additional
analysis using Logit supports H3. These results support Hardin et al. (2002) finding males
receive higher compensation compared with female recruits.

Pippin et al. (2014)
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concluded comparable findings when male judges ruled closer to the taxpayer when faced
with an estate tax valuation case. Also, Norrander and Wilcox (2008) revealed males
become more conservative over time. A conservative influence would lend to higher
compensation amounts siding with the taxpayer. Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000) found
similar results identifying that females tend to vote more liberally (siding with the Service)
which means rendering a lower percent of the disallowed amount.

Research Question 4
Are judges more likely to rule for a higher amount o f compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge?
Logit was used as a predictive tool in this analysis. The findings suggests if the
distribution of the decisions made is similar in the population, but every judge and taxpayer
was male, one could predict approximately 46.8% of the decisions made between a male
judge and a male taxpayer would have an outcome where the court decides a compensation
amount equal to the Compromise value or less. Furthermore, using the same rationale for
female judges and male taxpayers, we could expect about 84.3% of the decisions made for
a male taxpayer heard by a female judge would have an outcome where the court decides
a compensation amount equal to the Arbitrator amount or less. With a male judge and a
female taxpayer, we could predict approximately 51.2% of the decisions made would have
an outcome where the court decides a compensation amount equal to the “Compromiser”
amount or less. These interaction results are very interesting and significant to this study.
All combinations (male/male, male/female, and female/male) of the sexes are statistically
significant with a p-value o f0.000. Hypothesis H3A is supported but hypothesis H3B is not
supported. Pierce et al. (2013) findings mirror these results when a male judge is deciding
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since the male taxpayer received better treatment than the female taxpayer. Results in the
opposite direction are provided when the judge is female with males getting preferential
treatment to females. Last, female judges ruled against female taxpayers 20 out of 20 times
making predicting probabilities for female judges very difficult and unable to be computed
based on no variation when both genders are female. Hardin et al. (2002) concluded similar
results with female judges compensating male recruits more than female recruits.

Research Question 5
Are male taxpayers more likely to receive a compensation decision higher than
female taxpayers?
After running OLS with a dependent variable of “Percent of 100”(court determined
amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS determined amount),
the p-value of the variable taxpayer sex is 0.057 with a coefficient of 10.767. This suggests
as the taxpayer changes from being a female to a male, the “Percent of 100” increases by
10.77% providing evidence at the 0.10 significance level and marginal significance at the
0.05 level for H 4 . These results support Hardin et al. (2002) where male recruits were given
higher compensation than female recruits. The marginal effects are also calculated using
Logit.

The margin commands of Logit find if the distribution of the decisions made

remains the same in the population, but every taxpayer was male, one could anticipate
about 56.8% o f the decisions made for a male taxpayer would have an outcome where the
court decides a compensation amount equal to the “Compromiser” value or less. The
taxpayers’ sex of male is highly significant with a p-value of 0.000. This additional
analysis for males, using Logit, also supports H4.

Because female judges use a
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Compromise approach or ruled closer to the IRS 20 out of 20 times for female taxpayers,
probabilities for female judges are unable to be calculated.

Research Question 6
Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer than a judge appointed by a Democratic president?
Running OLS coupled with a dependent variable o f “Percent of 100”(court
determined amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS determined
amount), the p-value of the variable political affiliation is 0.646 with a coefficient of 3.927.
This result fails to provide support for Hs because of the lack o f significance. Next, Logit
was implemented but because political affiliation was not found in the list of covariates,
the margins command was unable to predict the probability failing to suggest support for
Hs. Moreover, to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the
decision-making of a Republican appointed president and a Democratic appointed
president, a Chi-Square test was run which is illustrated in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11
Chi-Square Results Between Political Parties

Political Affiliation
Democrat
Republican
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 0.2535

Closer to the Taxpayer or IRS
Taxpayer
IRS
9
17
85
129
94
146
Pr = 0.615

Total
26
214
240

There is not a significant difference in how the decisions are rendered at any level
of significance with a p-value of 0.615. This lack of an effect based on presidential
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appointment’s political party is contrary to the Jackson et al. (2013) study where an
association was found with political affiliation and the valuation decision made by the
judge. However, the lack of significance and inability to predict probability may suggest
presidential appointment has very little effect on the rendered decisions. This means
judges, regardless of appointment party, rule in very similar manners which is support for
a lack of bias in the U.S. Tax Court.

Research Question 7
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer when the
taxpayer has at least one appraiser?
Following the calculating of OLS with a dependent variable of “Percent of
100”(court determined amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount —IRS
determined amount), the p-value of the variable of number o f appraisers testifying for the
taxpayer is 0.193 with a coefficient of 4.383. The number of appraisers brought to court
was used in the OLS to study the impact of each individual appraiser/expert witness
brought before the court. This high p-value fails to provide support for H6 because o f the
lack o f significance. This conclusion is different from Jackson et al. (2013) which found
an association based on the number o f appraisers presented by the taxpayer. Then, Logit
was implemented but because of having at least one appraiser was not found in the list of
covariates, the margins command was also unable to predict the probability failing to
suggest support for H 6 . Furthermore, to determine whether or not there was a significant
difference between the decision-making of a judge hearing the testimony of at least one
appraiser and a case where no appraiser was put before the court, a Chi-Square test was
run which is illustrated in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.12
Chi-Square Results Between Taxpayers Presenting No Appraisers and One or More
Appraisers

Presenting an Appraiser (Taxpayer)
No Appraisers
At Least One Appraiser
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 4.2988

Closer to the Taxpayer or IRS
Taxpayer
IRS
32
32
62
114
94
146
Pr = 0.038

Total
64
176
240

The findings show a significant difference in how the decisions are rendered at the
0.10 and 0.05 significance levels with a p-value of 0.038. However, the inability to predict
probability may suggest the presence of an expert witness has very little effect on the
rendered decisions. This means judge’s holdings may be weakly affected by an expert
witness testifying on the taxpayer’s behalf in the U.S. Tax Court forum.

Research Question 8
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IRS when the Service
has at least one appraiser?
Once the OLS was computed with a dependent variable of “Percent of 100”(court
determined amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS determined
amount), the p-value of the variable of number of appraisers testifying for the Service is
0.128 with a coefficient of 5.657. Consequently, the number of appraisers brought to court
by the Commissioner was used in the OLS to study the impact of each individual appraiser
brought before the court. This conclusion fails to provide strong support for H7 because of
the marginal significance at the 0.10 level. This result is similar to Jackson et al. (2013)
which did not reveal an association based on the number o f appraisers presented by the
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IRS. Next, logit was conducted but because of having at least one appraiser was not found
in the list of covariates, the margins command was unable to predict the probability failing
to suggest support for H 7 . To determine whether or not there was a significant difference
between the decision-making of a judge hearing the testimony of at least one appraiser and
a case where no appraiser was put before the court by the Service, a Chi-Square test was
run which is illustrated in Table 4.13.

Table 4.13
Chi-Square Results Between the IRS Presenting No Appraisers and One or More
Appraisers

Presenting an Appraiser (IRS)
No Appraisers
At Least One Appraiser
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 0.8389

Closer to the Taxpayer or IRS
Taxpayer
IRS
35
46
59
100
94
146
Pr = 0.360

Total
81
159
240

A significant difference was not found in how the decisions were made with a pvalue of 0.360. Also, the inability to estimate probability may suggest the presence of an
expert witness presented by the Service has very little effect on the rendered decisions.
This means judges’ decisions may be weakly impacted in the U.S. Tax Court arena by the
presence of an IRS expert witness.

Research Question 9
Do judges have a higher probability ofruling in favor o f the taxpayer’s value
when multiple years are involved?
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The OLS was computed with a dependent variable of “Percent of 100” (co u rt
determined amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS determined
amount). As a result, the p-value of the variable of number of years decided is 0.000 with
a coefficient o f -8.266022. The number of years decided was studied in the OLS to evaluate
the effect of each individual tax year on the court decided amount. The result indicates
opposing support for Hs because of the significance and negative direction o f the
coefficient. This conclusion provides opposing results to Jackson et al. (2013) which found
an association based on the valuation of property or case having one or more parts.
Multiple tax years was the proxy for having one or several parts. Furthermore, Logit was
conducted but because the multiyear variable was not found in the list of covariates, the
margins command was unable to forecast probability failing to suggest support for Hs.
Additionally, to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the
decision-making o f a judge hearing a case covering a single tax year compared to multiple
tax years, a Chi-Square test was used which is depicted in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14
Chi-Square Results Between Cases with a Single Tax Year or Multiple Tax Years

Single/Multiple Tax Year Cases
Single Tax Year
Multiple Tax Years
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 0.2342

Closer to the Taxpayer or IRS
Taxpayer
IRS
15
20
79
126
94
146
Pr = 0.628

Total
35
205
240

No significant difference was found in how the decisions were rendered at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 significance levels with a p-value o f 0.628. However, the inability to predict
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probability may suggest that judges take the same approach when hearing cases i n v o l v i n g
one tax year and cases involving multiple tax years.

Research Question 10
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IR S’ value when the
judge has at least one daughter?
The statistical tool OLS was implemented with a dependent variable of “Percent of
100” (court determined amount - IRS determined amount)/(taxpayer claimed amount - IRS
determined amount).

The calculated p-value representing the variable of number of

daughters of the judge is 0.736 with a coefficient of 0.8224883. The number of daughters
is examined in the OLS to study the effect of each individual daughter on the court
determined amount. This evidence provides a lack of support for H9 because the p-value
is not significant and is different from Glynn and Sen (2014) which showed that males with
daughters voted more liberally. Moreover, Logit was used but because the having a
daughter or not having a daughter variable was not found in the list of covariates, the
margins command was unable to predict the probability failing to suggest support for H9 .
Also, to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the decision
making of a judge having at least one daughter or having only sons, a Chi-Square test was
used which is illustrated in Table 4.15.
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Table 4.15
Chi-Square Results Between a Judge Having No Daughters and a Judge Having at Least
One Daughter
Closer to the Taxpayer or IRS
Family Composition Having a Daughter
Does Not Have a Daughter
Has At Least One Daughter
Total
Pearson chi2(l) = 0.2721

Total
Taxpayer
38
56
94

IRS
64
82
146
Pr = 0.602

102
138
240

The results indicate there is not a significant difference in how the decisions are
rendered at the 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 significance levels with a p-value of 0.602. Therefore,
there does not seem to be evidence that family composition or personal relationships effect
how decisions are made in the U.S. Tax Court.

Survey Vignette - Behavioral Portion
Descriptive Statistics
A sample of CPAs was needed to determine current perceptions of tax professionals
to see if there was a gender, political affiliation, or family composition effect on how their
decisions were made. The surveys were sent out a week after April 15th in order to allow
CPAs to recover from tax “busy season.” CPAs were the target population for several
reasons. CPAs must go through rigorous training consisting of a certain course curriculum,
specified number of minimum credit hours, four examinations with a low pass rate, and a
required amount of time learning and working under another CPA. The four exams
demand proficiency in different areas of accounting (taxation, auditing, law, business
economic concepts). Also, a required amount of continuing professional education hours
are needed to renew the license every one or two years depending on the state.
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Additionally, taxpayers and corporations hire CPAs in a variety o f advisory roles including
setting reasonable compensation levels in closely held corporations. A pilot study or “soft
launch” was conducted and ended in the collection of 15 usable responses from 26
collected surveys. Adjustments were made to the survey in order to improve manipulation
checks on gender and compensation policy. Vast improvements were made to the survey
followed by a resending of the updated vignette.
The first “full launch” resulted in 305 responses. After analyzing the data, 61
responses were discarded from the data. One of those responses inputted a reasonable
compensation of $3,000,000 which was nearly twice the amount of the company’s total
income. The other 60 responses had compensation amounts o f less than $30,000. The
responses were dropped because of the absurdity of the subjects’ replies. A participant
even entered compensation amounts as low as $5. Following the removal and replacement
of the 61 responses, 305 adequate surveys were completed out o f 1,919 finished surveys.
This resulted in a response rate of 15.89%.

Also, multiple levels of checks were

implemented by Qualtrics. First, a profession question began the survey and offered five
choices of answers. Only when CPA was selected would the individual be permitted to
move forward. Next, a question addressed whether the participant had experience in
estimating reasonable compensation. If this question was answered in the negative, the
subject was dropped out of the survey. For the subjects that responded in the positive, one
of four vignettes was presented varying the gender of the described taxpayer and the
compensation policy. Two attention filters were located throughout the survey and a
separate question required compliance with selecting a certain color from the answer
choices. All of these filters were designed to remove those individuals who were not
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paying attention. Finally, a last guard against receiving unusable responses involved
removing any subject who responded to years of experience in estimating reasonable
compensation with zero years. The overall collection period took a month and eight days.
Also, the survey ended up with 151 male and 151 female responses with a total o f 302
usable responses. Qualtrics describes itself as a “leading insight technology provider.”20
Services provided by Qualtrics include Customer Sat (satisfaction) and NPS (Net Promoter
Score)21 tracking, market research, giving a voice to customers, academic research,
employee feedback, and concept testing.22 Pursuant to a discussion with a Qualtrics
employee, a unique process of gathering completed surveys is implemented. First, an
advertisement is sent out regarding the type of survey instrument. Subjects will then begin
completing the survey. However, once a quota is met, which in this case is gender, any
further participants are turned away. The quota requested by the researchers was a 50/50
gender split. Table 4.16 provides some descriptive statistics about the 302 CPA subjects.
The average time to complete each survey was 801.778 seconds or 13.36 minutes.

20http://www.qualtrics.com/about/
21 http://success.qualtrics.com/rs/qualtrics/images/Customer-Satisfaction-SurveyQuestions.pdf?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRoivKnNZKXonjHpfsX87u01XaO01MI%2F0ER3fOvrPUfGj
I4FS8ZhI%2BSLDwEYGJlv6SgFT7THMaZt3LgJWhM%3D
22 http://www.qualtrics.com/about/
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Table 4.16
Descriptive Statistics o f CPA Subjects

N

Minimum

Time to
Complete
302
222.0
Survey*
Compensation
302
30,000.0
Years Estimating
Reasonable
302
1.0
Compensation
Age
302
23.0
* Time is represented in seconds

Maximum

Mean

Std.
Deviation

19035.0

801.778

1273.3912

1,500,000.0

230,398.288

172308.5162

50.0

6.523

7.1925

92.0

41.480

12.6863

M anipulation Checks
Prior to the full launch, a first “soft launch” was conducted by Qualtrics designed
to identify potential problems with the survey. This pilot study resulted initially in 15
usable responses following the removal of several inadequate responses. Because o f the
low accuracy of the manipulation checks, the format of the vignette/scenario was changed
from predominantly paragraph form to presenting the information using bullet points. The
manipulation check percentages for correct responses were 93.33% (name of the taxpayer),
100% (taxpayer’s sex), 86.67% (amount disallowed by the IRS), 53% (existence of
compensation policy), and 60% (how bonuses were determined).
Five manipulation checks were used to determine if the subjects were paying
attention to the variables being manipulated. The first manipulation check asked the
participant to identify the name of the taxpayer in the scenario. This question examines
whether the subject knows the gender of the individual portrayed in the vignette. O f the
302 total responses, 266 correct answers (see Table 4.17) were given which means 88% of
the participants got the gender right in this question.
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Table 4.17
Manipulation Check Crosstabs for Name o f Taxpayer Question and Gender o f Taxpayer
in Scenario

Scenario
Sex
Total

Male
Female

What was the name of the taxpayer in the
scenario?
John
Mary
Do not know
132
10
13
10
134
3
142
144
16

Total
155
147
302

Table 4.18 shows the accuracy with which subjects answered a second
manipulation check based on the gender of the individual described in the scenario. As
noted in Table 4.18, 272 responses out of 302 were correct, resulting in 90% accuracy in
selecting the correct gender. Both checks on gender indicated a high accuracy rate on the
importance o f gender when deciding reasonable compensation.

Table 4.18
Manipulation Check Crosstabs for Gender o f Taxpayer Question and Gender o f
Taxpayer in Scenario
What was the sex of the taxpayer in
the scenario?
Scenario
Sex
Total

Male
Female

Male
141
11
152

Female
8
131
139

Do not know
6
5
11

Total
155
147
302

A third manipulation check concentrated on the amount disallowed by the IRS. The
“correct” disallowed amount was $390,000. As noted in Table 4.19, 188 out o f 302
(62.3%) individuals got this number right. The rationale behind this lower accuracy
percentage may be attributed to the subject focusing on other aspects of the scenario such
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as total income or ROE. Also, while 62.3% is not as high as originally anticipated, it still
reflects that nearly two-thirds of the subjects understood the correct disallowed amount.
Table 4.19
Manipulation Check Frequency Tab fo r the Correct Disallowed Amount

Valid

$290,000
$390,000
$490,000
$590,000
Do not
know
Total

Frequency
31
188
29
30

Percent
10.3
62.3
9.6
9.9

Valid Percent
10.3
62.3
9.6
9.9

Cumulative
Percent
10.3
72.5
82.1
92.1

24

7.9

7.9

100.0

302

100.0

100.0

The results o f the fourth manipulation check requesting the subject to recall whether
the firm described in the vignette had a compensation policy had an accuracy rate of 61.5%.
Only 29.1% answered the question incorrectly (9.4% did not know). This percent may be
lower because CPAs may not give substantial weight to an explicit compensation policy or
lack thereof. However, well over half of the subjects got this question correct and the
percentage of correct responses is deemed a suitably robust manipulation for the
experiment (see Table 4.20).
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Table 4.20
Manipulation Check Crosstab for Compensation Policy Question and Party Favored in
the Scenario

Scenario
Favor
Total

Taxpayer
IRS

Did ID have a compensation policy?
Do not
Yes
No
know
90
44
14
44
96
14
134
140
28

Total
148
154
302

The last manipulation check question also examined the subject’s knowledge on
how the bonuses were paid, which relates to the type of compensation policy manipulated
in each scenario. As revealed in Table 4.21, 69.2% of the participants answered this
question correctly and only 20.2% answered this question incorrectly (10.6% did not
know). Thus, over two-thirds of the subjects knew when bonuses were paid relating to the
favorableness of the corporate compensation policy, as this manipulation check was strong.

Table 4.21
Manipulation Check Crosstab for Bonus Determination Question and Party Favored in
the Scenario

Scenario
Favor
Total

Taxpayer
IRS

How were bonuses determined? Check
only one below.
At the end
of year
based on
Beginning
availability
of year
Do not know
39
89
20
120
22
12
159
111
32

Total
148
154
302
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The main variable being studied and manipulated in the survey was gender. Both
o f the manipulation check questions related to gender were answered with high accuracy
(88% and 90%). Overall, the modification of the vignette material after the pilot study
increased the correct response percent regarding the compensation policy. Because most
o f the subjects correctly distinguished gender, the researchers felt confident in the survey
instrument. The manipulation checks analyzing responses to the disallowed amount and
compensation policy questions were not as high as the gender questions. However, this
fact does not necessarily detract from the results.

These findings may indicate the

disallowed amount or how compensation was structured to be awarded did not play a major
role in the CPA’s determination of reasonable compensation. However, a majority o f the
subjects in all cases understood the information in the scenarios which is most important.
Last, three attention filters were inserted throughout the survey. Each question
directed the subject to select a specific answer to demonstrate that the respondent was
reading the question and following instructions by appropriately selecting the correct
answer. If a participant selected an incorrect answer, that participant would be removed
from the survey. As a result, none of the participants retained in the final analysis selected
an incorrect response and all three filters reflected a 100% positive response rate. Thus,
the attention filters further reinforced that all participants were paying attention to the
survey questions and following directions.

Research Question 1
Is there a significant difference in how male and female judges render a
reasonable compensation decision?
After running an ANOVA with the dependent variable of reasonable
compensation decided on by the subject’s gender partaking in the survey, gender is not
statistically significant based on a p-value of 0.526 (see Table 4.22). This result is
inconsistent with the findings from the archival portion. However, because CPAs were
the individuals completing the surveys, this result is not entirely surprising. The lack
o f significance from administering the ANOVA suggests gender does not impact
decision-making by tax practitioners when taking a position on a tax return.

In

addition, CPAs must meet similar requirements across the country in order to become
a CPA. Some of these requirements include 150 credit hours, completing all four
sections of the CPA exam, and meeting a time requirement working under another
CPA. Also, penalties on tax professionals for understating tax liability or due to fraud
are quite severe (5% to 75%). Moreover, this conclusion supports Segal (2000) which
found no difference in the way traditional judges (white and male) make decisions
from those non-traditional judges (African American and female). Smith and Oakley
(1997), similarly, failed to identify gender-related differences when evaluating ethical
behaviors.
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Table 4.22
Results o f Running an ANOVA Between Male and Female CPA Subjects Mean
Compensation

Source
Corrected
Model
Intercept
CPA
Gender
Error
Total
Corrected
Total
a. R Squared =

Type III Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

12007595179.088*

1

12007595179.088

.404

.526

16031178087285.100

1

16031178087285.100

538.878

.000

12007595179.103

1

12007595179.103

.404

.526

8924750059624.840
24967935742089.000

300
302

29749166865.416

8936757654803.930

301

.001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.00 2)

Research Question 3
Are male judges more likely to rule fo r a higher amount o f compensation fo r
the taxpayer than female judges?
Table 4.23 shows the calculated means for a male subject and a female subject.
The arithmetic mean for a male subject deciding reasonable compensation for the
taxpayer described in the scenario is $224,092.72. The average for a female subject
deciding reasonable compensation for the taxpayer designated in the vignette is
$236,703.86. The difference between these two means is $12,611.14. As noted
earlier, with a p-value o f 0.526, the difference in reasonable compensation based on
the participant’s gender is not statistically significant which may imply that gender
does not impact a CPA’s judgment when giving tax practitioner advice.
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Table 4.23
Mean Compensation o f Male and Female CPA Subjects
CPA Gender
Male
Female
Total

Mean (dollars)
224,092.72
236,703.86
230,398.29

Std. Deviation
174311.8891
170627.3690
172308.5162

N
151
151
302

Research Question 4
Are judges more likely to decide on a higher amount o f compensation when the
taxpayer is the same sex as the judge (male/male or female/female)?
The highest mean arises from a female participant and a female taxpayer with
compensation of $252,260.27 (see Table 4.24). The lowest average occurs in the situation
with a male subject and a male taxpayer at $214,831.17 (see Table 4.24). In one regard,
these results provide evidence of social identity when both individuals are female. On the
other hand, a male in both roles produces the lowest arithmetic mean indicating support
against social identity theory. Consequently, the interaction is not statistically significant.

Table 4.24
CPA Gender and Taxpayer Gender in Scenario Interaction Mean Compensation
CPA Gender and Taxpayer
Gender
Male
Male
Female
Total
Male
Female
Female
Total
Total
Male
Female
Total

Mean (dollars)
214,831.17
233,729.73
224,092.72
222,144.65
252,260.27
236,703.86
218,511.50
242,931.97
230,398.29

Std. Deviation
172682.8286
176648.6566
174311.8891
144449.3781
194586.5294
170627.3690
158626.3436
185368.3360
172308.5162

N
77
74
151
78
73
151
155
147
302
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The interaction o f participant sex and taxpayer sex described in the scenario has a
p-value of 0.778 which is not statistically significant (see Table 4.25). This result indicates
that whether the gender between the subject and taxpayer is the same (male/male or
female/female) or different (male/female or female/male), the decision made is not
significantly different. It appears that the participant makes the same decision regardless
of the sex of the taxpayer described in the vignette. Also, the main effects of subject gender
and scenario sex or taxpayer’s sex outlined in the scenario are not significant with a pvalue of 0.516 and 0.218, respectively (see Table 4.25). As a result, it would appear that
CPAs make decisions in an objective manner based on the facts and circumstances
presented. The male CPA subject finding fails to provide support for social identity theory
and Pierce et al. (2013) which concluded that males permit equitable relief more when the
requesting spouse is male. However, Bemmels (1988) concluded a similar result to the
current findings where male grievants were treated worse than female grievants by male
judges. Hardin et al. (2002) results align with the results of this study since opposite
genders were being treated better when the judge in the current study was male.
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Table 4.25
CPA Gender and Taxpayer Gender in Scenario Interaction Mean Compensation
ANOVA Results
Type III Sum of
Source
Squares
df
Mean Square
Corrected
59684742260.348*
19894914086.783
3
Model
Intercept
16066979016892.600
1
16066979016892.600
CPA Gender
12597472883.338
1
12597472883.338
Taxpayer
45311296092.752
1
45311296092.752
Gender
CPA Gender*
Taxpayer
2373127162.204
2373127162.204
1
Gender
Error
8877072912543.580
298
29788835276.992
Total
24967935742089.000
302
Corrected
8936757654803.930
301
Total
a. R Squared = .007 (Adjusted R Squared = -.003)

F

Sig.

.668

.572

539.362
.423

.000
.516

1.521

.218

.080

.778

Table 4.26 depicts judge gender, taxpayer gender, and the type of vignette described
either favoring the taxpayer or the IRS. For a male judge, Hio is not supported since the
mean compensation for a male taxpayer ($209,612.50) in a vignette with more support
(Compensation policy is retained) for the taxpayer is lower than when a female taxpayer
($229,600) is described in the same situation (see Table 4.26). These results are contrary
to social identity theory. Conversely, Hio is supported when a female judge rules with a
taxpayer favored vignette because female taxpayers ($290,735.29) receive a higher average
compensation than male taxpayers ($205,128.21). Hi i is not supported either when a male
or female judge is rendering a decision in an IRS favored (No retained compensation
policy) vignette since the taxpayer o f the opposite gender is receiving a higher mean
compensation in both situations. A male taxpayer’s case decided on by a female judge
received $239,161.10 where a female taxpayer’s case was only awarded $218,717.95.

When the judge was male and the evidence sided with the Service, a male taxpayer was
given an average compensation of $220,472.97 and a female taxpayer was compensated at
$237,435.90.

This result contradicts social identity theory because the out-group or

taxpayer with the opposite gender from the judge/participant received better treatment than
the in-group or same gender taxpayer.

Table 4.26
CPA Gender, Taxpayer Gender in Scenario, and Scenario Favor Interaction Mean
Compensation
CPA Gender/Taxpayer Gender/Scenario Favor
Male
Male
Taxpayer
IRS
Female

Total

Female

Male

Female

Total

Total

Male

Female

Total

Total
Taxpayer

Mean (dollars)
209,612.50
220,472.97
214,831.17
229,600.00

Std. Deviation
185044.9179
160604.8440
172682.8286
201885.9900

N
40
37
77
35

IRS

237,435.90

153129.0812

39

Total

233,729.73

176648.6566

74

Taxpayer

218,940.00

192025.1595

75

IRS

229,177.63

155995.2073

76

Total

224,092.72

174311.8891

151

Taxpayer

205,128.21

117380.8869

39

IRS

239,161.10

167056.0067

39

Total

222,144.65

144449.3781

Taxpayer

290,735.29

259253.3929

78
34

IRS

218,717.95

104376.0783

39

Total

252,260.27

194586.5294

73

Taxpayer

245,000.00

199815.8875

73

IRS

228,939.53

138762.0753

78

Total

236,703.86

170627.3690

151

Taxpayer

207,398.73

154396.8700

79

IRS

230,062.93

163123.8798

76

Total

218,511.50

158626.3436

155

Taxpayer

259,724.64

232259.8623

69

IRS
Total
Taxpayer
IRS

228,076.92
242,931.97
231,793.92
229,057.03

130526.4833
185368.3360
195675.5951
147034.2625

78
147
148
154

Total

230,398.29

172308.5162

302
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Research Question 5
Are male taxpayers more likely to receive a higher amount o f compensation than
female taxpayers?
Table 4.27 illustrates the means of the taxpayers delineated in the vignette based on
gender.

When the scenario identifies a male taxpayer, the average reasonable

compensation awarded is $218,511.50. On the other hand, when the vignette depicts a
female taxpayer, the mean reasonable compensation is $242,931.97. This suggests female
taxpayers get better treatment in reasonable compensation cases compared to male
taxpayers with a difference of $24,420.41.

Table 4.27
Mean Compensation o f Male and Female Taxpayers Described in Scenario
Taxpayer Sex
Male
Female
Total

Mean (dollars)
218,511.50
242,931.97
230,398.29

Std. Deviation
158626.3436
185368.3360
172308.5162

N
155
147
302

Table 4.28 shows scenario sex has a p-value 0.219 which is approaching significant
but is not significant at the 0.10 level. This finding suggests that female taxpayers receive
similar compensation amounts to male taxpayers. This lack of significance provides
differing results from Hardin et al. (2002) which found males were treated better than
females by receiving higher salaries.
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Table 4.28
Results o f Running an ANOVA Between Male and Female Taxpayer Awarded Mean
Compensation in Scenario

Source
Corrected
Model
Intercept
Taxpayer Sex

Type III Sum o f Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

44993534497.281*

1

44993534497.281

1.518

.219

16064940093609.900

1

16064940093609.900

542.016

.000

1.518

.219

44993534497.297

1

44993534497.297

Error

8891764120306.650

300

29639213734.356

Total

24967935742089.000

302

Corrected
8936757654803.930
301
Total
a. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .002)

Research Question 6
Do judges who are appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability
o f ruling in favor o f the taxpayer than a judge selected by a Democratic president?
Table 4.29 presents the arithmetic means of determined compensation among
subjects who identified themselves as either republican, democrat, independent, other, or
individuals with no affiliation. The average compensation for a republican subject is
$266,822.22. A democratic participant had a mean amount of $215,082.28. Independent
and “other” political affiliations had averages of $195,443.93 and $250,000.00,
respectively. Finally, no political affiliation had an arithmetic mean of $300,534.04.

114
Table 4.29
Mean Compensation o f Subjects Based on Political Affiliation
Political Affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other
None
Total

Mean (dollars)
266,822.22
215,082.28
195,443.93
250,000.00
300,534.04
230,398.29

Std. Deviation
170458.9692
152365.2711
145880.3194
0.0000
293970.8460
172308.5162

N
90
79
107
3
23
302

Table 4.30 indicates a p-value of 0.011 following the running of an ANOVA. This
implies that there is a statistically significant difference between the political affiliations of
the CPAs and how they render decisions. This finding is important because it illustrates
that the CPA’s political affiliation whether Republican, Democrat, or another type of
affiliation affects the individual’s judgment when confronted with making an objective
decision based on facts and circumstances. The significant political affiliation aligns with
Jackson et al. (2013) which identified an association between having a Republican
affiliated president appoint the judge and estate valuation.

Table 4.30
Results o f Running an ANOVA o f Mean Compensation Between Subjects Based on
Political Affiliation
Source
Corrected
Model
Intercept

Type III Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

382958738074.143*

4

95739684518.536

3.324

.011

3677963053765.700

1

3677963053765.700

127.704

.000

3.324

.011

Political
Affiliation
Error

382958738074.150

4

95739684518.537

8553798916729.790

297

28800669753.299

Total

24967935742089.000

302

Corrected Total

301
8936757654803.930
a. R Squared = .043 (Adjusted R Squared = .030)

Table 4.31 shows the interaction mean compensation of political affiliation and
favorable or unfavorable outcomes. H 12 is supported because a taxpayer favored scenario
had a mean compensation o f $271,574.47 when ruled on by a Republican CPA compared
w itham ean compensation of$215,041.67 when decided by a Democratic CPA. When the
vignette favors the IRS, the Democratic CPA’s mean is lower compensating the individual
at $215,116.28 with the Republican CPA holding an average compensation to be
$261,627.91. This finding indicates a Republican CPA tends to render higher amounts o f
compensation favoring the taxpayer and the Democratic CPA awards lower amounts of
compensation appearing to side with the IRS’s decision.

Table 4.31
Political Affiliation and Scenario Favor Interaction Mean Compensation
Political Affiliation and Scenario
Favor
Republican
Taxpayer
IRS
Total
Taxpayer
Democrat
IRS
Total
Independent
Taxpayer
IRS
Total
Other
IRS
Total
None
Taxpayer
IRS
Total
Total
Taxpayer
IRS
Total

Mean
(dollars)
271,574.47
261,627.91
266,822.22
215,041.67
215,116.28
215,082.28
183,684.21
208,850.00
195,443.93
250,000.00
250,000.00
416,250.00
238,818.87
300,534.04
231,793.92
229,057.03
230,398.29

Std. Deviation
176071.2238
166027.5398
170458.9692
146785.4788
158615.6194
152365.2711
163591.1888
122910.9620
145880.3194
0.0000
0.0000
456858.4495
140388.3583
293970.8460
195675.5951
147034.2625
172308.5162

N
47
43
90
36
43
79
57
50
107
3
3
8
15
23
148
154
302
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Table 4.32 identifies the main effects of political affiliation and scenario favor and
the two-way interaction of affiliation and favor. Political affiliation is very significant by
itself with a p-value of 0.003. Also, the scenario favor is also significant having a p-value
of 0.093.

The interaction is significant with a p-value of 0.10 indicating statistical

significance between the political affiliation and scenario favor. The statistical significance
can be found in Table 4.32.

Table 4.32
Results o f Running an ANOVA o f Mean Compensation Between Subjects Based on
Political Affiliation and Scenario Favor

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

Type III Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

566302096086.736*

8

70787762010.842

2.478

.013

5560427141828.210

1

5560427141828.210

194.638

.000

459355008566.078

4

114838752141.520

4.020

.003

80943354566.873

1

80943354566.873

2.833

.093

180260523530.355

3

60086841176.785

2.103

.100

8370455558717.190

293

28568107708.932

24967935742089.000

302

8936757654803.930

301

Whatisyourpoliticalaffiliation

ScenarioFavor
Whatisyourpoliticalaffiliation
* ScenarioFavor

Error
Total
Corrected Total

a. R Squared = .063 (Adjusted R Squared = .038)

Research Question 10
Do judges have a higher probability o f ruling in favor o f the IR S ’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter?
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Table 4.33 delineates the arithmetic means of derived compensation for subjects
who have at least one daughter and for subjects who do not have at least one daughter. The
average for a participant with at least one daughter is $224,632.08. The arithmetic mean
for a participant with no daughters is $236,809.67. This comparison provides limited
support, however, it is not statistically significant as indicated in Table 4.34.

Table 4.33
Mean Compensation fo r CPAs With and Without Daughters
Having at least one daughter
Yes
No
Total

Mean (dollars)
224,632.075
236,809.671
230398.288

Std. Deviation
184140.3346
158518.2748
172308.5162

N
159
143
302

Even though an individual that does not have at least one daughter has a higher
mean, the difference is not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.541 (see Table 4.34)
failing to support H 13. Therefore, there is no support that having a daughter makes a
difference in how subjects decide reasonable compensation failing to support Glynn and
Sen (2015) although mean compensation is lower when the CPA subject has at least one
daughter showing a more liberal voting pattern.
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Table 4.34
Results o f Running an ANOVA o f Mean Compensation Between Subjects Having At Least
One Daughter and Not Having At Least One Daughter

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

Type III Sum of
Squares
11164758475.281*

df
1

Mean Square
11164758475.281

F
.375

Sig.
.541

16030976752111.100

1

16030976752111.100

538.821

.000

.375

.541

Having or Not
Having A
Daughter
Error

11164758475.290

1

11164758475.290

8925592896328.650

300

29751976321.096

Total

24967935742089.000

302

Corrected Total

8936757654803.930
301
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002)

The ANOVA revealed that the mean for a male participant with at least one
daughter examining a male taxpayer is $214,512.50 (see Table 4.35). That same individual
and situation where the individual does not have a daughter is $215,175.68 (see Table
4.35). When a male subject with at least one daughter is evaluating a female taxpayer, the
mean is $216,545.46 (see Table 4.35). This same circumstance where the male does not
have a daughter produces a mean of $247,560.98 (see Table 4.35) hinting at a lack of
support for H r . These results support an individual ruling more liberally (siding with the
Service) when having at least one daughter supporting Glynn and Sen (2015).
The average for a female participant, assuming the judge’s role, with at least one
daughter examining a male taxpayer is $207,209.30 (see Table 4.35). That same person
and situation where the participant, assuming the judge’s role, does not have a daughter is
$240,493.80 (see Table 4.35).

When a female subject with at least one daughter is

evaluating a vignette depicting a female taxpayer, the mean compensation is $257,674.42
(see Table 4.35). This same circumstance where the female does not have a daughter shows
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a mean compensation of $244,500 (see Table 4.35). When a female judge has a daughter
and is ruling on a female taxpayer, the mean tends to be the highest of all decisions made
by the female judge indicating support for H r . The result may show personal alignment
toward the taxpayer providing a favorable ruling. On the other hand, when a female judge
rules for a male taxpayer, having a daughter decreases the allowed compensation resulting
in a more liberal holding.

Table 4.35
CPA Gender, Taxpayer Gender, and Having or Not Having a Daughter Interaction
Based on Mean Compensation
CPA Gender, Taxpayer Gender, Having or
Not Having Daughter
Male
Male
Yes

Mean (dollars)
214,512.50

No
215,175.68
Total
214,831.17
Female

Yes
216,545.45
No
247,560.98
Total
233,729.73

Total

Yes
215,431.51
No
232,198.72
Total
224,092.72

Female

Male

Yes
207,209.30
No
240,493.80
Total
222,144.65

Female

Yes
257,674.42

Std. Deviation

N

211073.0669

40

121190.9774

37

172682.8286

77

154070.0107

33

193697.9670

41

176648.6566

74

186234.5690

73

163162.5422

78

174311.8891

151

126769.8624

43

163627.2546

35

144449.3781

78

224619.6490

43
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CPA Gender, Taxpayer Gender, Having or
Not Having Daughter
No

Mean (dollars)

Std. Deviation

N

244,500.00

144325.7212

30

194586.5294

73

183071.4168

86

153838.3197

65

170627.3690

151

171563.5469

83

142936.1232

72

158626.3436

155

196985.7329

76

173410.5745

71

185368.3360

147

184140.3346

159

158518.2748

143

172308.5162

302

Total
252,260.27
Total

Yes
232,441.86
No
242,342.82
Total
236,703.86

Total

Male

Yes
210,728.92
No
227,483.10
Total
218,511.50

Female

Yes
239,815.79
No
246,267.61
Total
242,931.97

Total

Yes
224,632.08
No
236,809.67
Total
230,398.29

The main effects, two-way, and three-way interactions are shown in Table 4.36.
The main effect of participant’s gender is not significant with a p-value of 0.486. This
indicates that the subject’s gender is not statistically significant by itself. The taxpayer’s
sex main effect variable is also non-statistically significant with a p-value of 0.270
implying that gender of the individual described in the vignette is not significant on its
own. Last, the main effect of having at least one daughter or having no daughters is not
significant with a p-value of 0.520. The two-way interaction of gender of the survey taker

121

and the sex of the person described in the survey is not significant having a p-value of
0.803.

This provides evidence against social identity theory.

The second two-way

interaction of judge’s sex and having at least one daughter is not significant either with a
p-value of 0.886. The interaction of taxpayer gender and the judge having at least one
daughter is not significant with a p-value of 0.841. Last, the three-way interaction of
subject’s sex, taxpayer’s sex, and family composition is not statistically significant having
a p-value o f 0.340. As a result, there is no statistically significant evidence that having a
daughter makes a difference in how subjects decide reasonable compensation failing to
back Glynn and Sen (2015).

Table 4.36
CPA Gender, Taxpayer Gender, and Having or Not Having a Daughter Interaction
ANOVA Results based on Mean Compensation
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

Type III Sum of
Squares
101724597683.525*

df
7

Mean Square
14532085383.361

.484

Sig.
.846

F

15799847503915.300

1

15799847503915.300

525.765

.000

CPA Gender

14619976493.892

1

14619976493.892

.487

.486

Taxpayer Gender

36727141945.417

1

36727141945.417

1.222

.270

12466852059.747

1

12466852059.747

.415

.520

1869161813.283

1

1869161813.283

.062

.803

622083170.239

1

622083170.239

.021

.886

1205845570.041

1

1205845570.041

.040

.841

.913

.340

Having or Not Having a
Daughter
CPA Gender * Taxpayer
Gender
CPA Gender * Having or
Not Having A Daughter
Taxpayer Gender * Having
or Not Having A Daughter
CPA Gender * Taxpayer
Gender * Having or Not
Having A Daughter
Error

27424284952.724

1

27424284952.724

8835033057120.400

294

30051132847.348

Total

24967935742089.000

302

8936757654803.930
a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = -.012)

301

Corrected Total
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Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Archival Portion
Hi:

There is a statistically significant difference between male and female judge
decisions in reasonable compensation cases. SUPPORTED

H2 :

The “Compromise” amount (arithmetic mean) will be significant in explaining the
Court’s determined figure. SUPPORTED

H3:

Male judges are more likely to rule for higher amounts o f compensation than
female judges. SUPPORTED

H3A:

Male judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when the
taxpayer is a male opposed to a female taxpayer. SUPPORTED

H3B:

Female judges are more likely to rule for a higher amount of compensation when
the taxpayer is female compared to a male taxpayer. NOT SUPPORTED

H4:

Male taxpayers are more likely to receive a decision of higher compensation than
female taxpayers. SUPPORTED

Hs:

Judges appointed by a Republican president have a higher probability of ruling in
favor o f the taxpayer than a judge named by a Democratic president. NOT
SUPPORTED

H6:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer when the
taxpayer presents at least one appraiser. NOT SUPPORTED

H7:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS when the IRS
presents at least one appraiser. NOT SUPPORTED

Hs:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the taxpayer’s value when
multiple tax years are involved. NOT SUPPORTED
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H9:

Judges have a higher probability of ruling in favor of the IRS’s value when the
judge has at least one daughter. NOT SUPPORTED

Survey Results
Hio:

Male (female) judges grant higher compensation to male (female) taxpayers when
compared to female (male) judges when the outcome of the case is protaxpayer.
NOT SUPPORTED

Hi 1:

Female (male) judges agree more with unfavorable outcomes when dealing with
male (female) taxpayers. NOT SUPPORTED

H12:

Conservative (liberal) judges agree more with favorable (unfavorable) outcomes
for the taxpayer than liberal (conservative) judges. SUPPORTED

H13:

A judge having at least one daughter will agree more with a decision of an
unfavorable outcome for the taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least one
daughter. NOT SUPPORTED

H14:

A judge having at least one daughter will agree more with a decision with a
favorable outcome for a female taxpayer than a judge who does not have at least
one daughter. NOT SUPPORTED

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this chapter is to review the findings of this study and their
implications. Also, limitations of the study and future research suggestions are presented
along with concluding remarks. The chapter starts with an overview of the preceding
chapters.

Summary of Previous Chapters
Chapter One begins with the introduction of the reasonable compensation concept.
Why this area of taxation is so important to closely held corporation is summarized and the
tax ramifications. Additionally, no previous study has examined reasonable compensation,
gender, political affiliation, and family composition in the same study.
A review of significant events, cases, and authority leading up to the current tax
code on reasonable compensation is discussed in Chapter Two. Moreover, prior research
on the reasonable compensation and gender topic are presented separately.
Chapter Three discusses the research questions and the methodology to be used in
investigating these questions. Also, survey development, selection of the study subjects,
case selection, and analytical methods for both the archival and behavioral portion are
discussed.
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In Chapter Four, the study’s results are presented. First, descriptive information
describing the cases involved in the archival portion of the study is presented. Next, the
methodology used is analyzed and the results are interpreted based on the findings related
to the archival part. Then, descriptive statistics are delineated from the participants in the
behavioral portion of this study followed by the implemented statistical tools and the
subsequent findings.

Summary of Research Findings - Archival Portion
The results indicate that judge gender plays a significant role in the decisions made
by U.S. Tax Court judges. That is, a male judge rules for a statistically significant higher
amount of reasonable compensation than a female judge when facing a reasonable
compensation issue in the Tax Court arena by almost 32%. This provides support that
characteristics other than the facts and circumstances of a case do come into play when a
dispute is brought before the judiciary. Furthermore, since a higher proportion of the total
amount of judges in the U.S. Tax Court are male, a taxpayer has a higher probability of
being assigned to a male judge increasing the chances of either sustaining the amount of
compensation claimed or receiving a decision allowing more than the IRS permits.
Gender also plays an important role coming from the standpoint of the individual
who is challenging the Service. When a male taxpayer litigates against the Commissioner,
the judge renders a decision significantly higher than when a female decides to challenge
the IRS’s allowed amount by nearly 11%. This piece o f evidence can affect the decision
making process of an individual or closely-held corporation when determining whether or
not to challenge a ruling handed down by the Service.
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Other significant variables from running the ordinary least squares regression
included tenure of the judge and number of years decided in the case. Tenure, representing
the number of years between when the case was ruled on and the year of appointment,
suggests the more experience a judge receives over the years of being on the judicial panel,
the more he or she sides with the decisions made by the Commissioner with each additional
year of experience. Also, as the number of tax years in a case increase, the compensation
allowed decreases providing evidence that judges, in order to potentially combat a heavy
docket load, tend to side more with the IRS when multiple tax years are involved.
An interesting finding is the number of appraisers provided by the taxpayer and the
Service is not significant in figuring the amount of allowable reasonable compensation.
That is, additional support for a party’s position is more impacted by the facts and
circumstances highlighted in the business as opposed to having an expert witness argue on
their behalf.
Additionally, political affiliation is not significant positing that little bias exists
based on the president’s political party alignment flowing through to the decisions made
by their judicial appointments to the U.S. Tax Court. This piece of evidence shows that
judges are not affected by the individual who appoints them or the party affiliated with that
person. If this variable was significant, then the power of appointment would be crucial in
shaping tax law and the tax judicial process.
Last, family composition, studied by examining the number of daughters o f each
judge, is not significant giving little evidence that family relationships affect a judge’s
decision in the U.S. Tax Court. Because each individual’s personal relationships are
different, this variable could differ depending on family makeup o f the judge.
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Summary of Research Findings - Behavioral Portion
The results from the behavioral portion of this study indicate some

in te re s tin g

findings. First, the gender of the CPA is not significant. This finding is not surprising
based on the training a CPA must undergo to get licensed and retain a license. Each state
establishes its own guidelines in order to become a CPA. Typically, these criteria involve
a minimum number of college credits in accounting, a time requirement working under a
CPA, and the passage o f four different exams keying in on certain accountings areas.
Furthermore, continuing professional education requirements must be met each year.
There is variation among the states, but overall the conditions are very similar. The lack
of statistical significance provides evidence that CPAs, based on common training, make
decisions by examining the facts and circumstances of the situation at hand and not letting
their gender play a role in how they make decisions. Because a lot of CPAs offer tax
advice, this evidence shows the position CPAs are taking appear to be without gender bias.
Second, the sex of the taxpayer the CPA is ruling on fails to be statistically
significant. This implies that CPAs give similar counsel to their clients based only on the
evidence provided to them. As a result, it appears that gender characteristics do not affect
CPAs in their decision-making process.
Third, political affiliation is statistically significant at all three levels of
significance. This conclusion posits that CPAs’ political views do impact their decision
making manner. Republicans rule for a higher amount of compensation providing support
that these individuals are more pro-taxpayer than democrats and independents.
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Implications
Reasonable compensation will continue to be a highly litigated area of taxation
under the current federal tax system because of the ambiguity that exists in the code and
regulations as well as the large number of closely held corporations that operate in the
United States.

To address this ambiguous area of taxation, code sections, treasury

regulations, and revenue rulings have been promulgated to assist in providing measurable
guidelines. However, deciding on the reasonableness of compensation paid by closely held
corporations to key employees will remain a subjective process warranting individual
assessment based on the facts and circumstances of each specific case. Identifying other
characteristics that impact a judge’s decision-making process will not only assist the
taxpayer in determining whether to move forward with litigation, it will also provide a
roadmap based on the probability of getting a certain type of judge with specific types of
characteristics. In the archival part of this study, the chances of having a male judge rule
over a case are much higher and the likelihood of receiving a higher amount of reasonable
compensation is significantly higher. Also, the gender o f the taxpayer can potentially affect
the awarded amount of compensation. This particular detail is known prior to any type of
litigation. The objective of reasonable compensation is to allow an equitable amount of
payments to be made to individuals based on the value they bring to the company. If the
ruling is made based on the gender of the judge, the taxpayer’s gender, or other
characteristics outside the scope of the facts and circumstances of the case, then an
objective ruling may not be rendered. In addition, explicit all-inclusive factors, the need
for an appraiser approved by the IRS or some other third party, or a Supreme Court ruling
would shed much needed light onto this area of ambiguity.
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In the behavioral portion of this research, the current perceptions of Certified Public
Accountants depict a lack of gender bias. This finding may be attributed to similar training
required by the different states in order to become licensed. The other party affected in
these decisions is the taxpayer.

Although female taxpayers received a higher mean

compensation amount than male taxpayers, the difference was not statistically significant.
This suggests that CPAs treat the taxpayers relatively the same when giving tax advice.
On the other hand, political affiliation is significant based on the CPA’s self-selected party
alignment. As a result, a taxpayer may need to inquire about his or her CPA’s political
views when taking positions recommended by their tax counsel.

Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations from the archival portion. The first limitation is the
available information on the judges and their family composition. The only information
found on Judge Simpson about his family was that he was 59 years old with no children.
Therefore, this judge was coded as having 0 daughters. Another judge did not appear to
have any children by blood but was found to have adopted children. In this specific case,
the adopted offspring was looked at no differently than those judges having kids by blood.
Judge Goffe was left out of the analysis because information was not available on family
composition.

This resulted in two less observations.

Four other observations were

excluded based of the lack of information provided in the tax summary opinions describing
the businesses. Therefore, no conclusion could be determined whether these were closely
held corporations or not. In comparison to the overall number of cases, these omissions
were not considered serious.
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A second limitation included dropping cases when no numbers were given
regarding amounts. In these cases, the court decided in favor of the IRS or the taxpayer,
but no further detail was given. The amount deducted by the taxpayer and the amount
allowed by the IRS could not be determined or the amounts could not be distinguished
based on the detail provided in the tax court summary opinion. As a result, these cases
were not included in the analysis. Also, three cases involving S corporations contested
based on reasonable compensation were dropped when the IRS was challenging the
taxpayer’s salary arguing it was too low. Obviously, this is a different situation where the
taxpayer is trying to bail more money out as distributions. Since this situation is contrary
to that being studied, these cases were not included in the study. Additionally, some cases
contained combined amounts of deductions taken and amounts disallowed by the IRS. In
these instances, the cases were included if the sex of all of the taxpayers were the same. If
multiple sexes and taxpayers were looked at and the amounts were not divided to
distinguish between amounts, then the cases were removed from the analysis.
A third limitation is that the scenario described in the vignette closely resembles a
case where the U.S. Tax Court sided with the IRS. A different case may have resulted in
different numbers had the details been more favorable toward the taxpayer’s position.
Using a completely different scenario would serve to validate the findings from this study.
A fourth limitation may arise because CPAs with no experience estimating reasonable
compensation were dropped from the survey panel. However, since experience builds
business and tax acumen, this is not viewed as a serious limitation.
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Future Research
The results from this study posit that there is a gender effect based on the judge
rendering the decision and the sex of the taxpayer. This leads to the question of whether
a gender bias is present in other areas of taxation that are frequently litigated such as
realtor versus dealer status. Additionally, a study implementing a different scenario
targeting lawyers or CVAs (Certified Valuation Analysts) would be useful in validating
the study’s findings.

Conclusion
When reasonable compensation is challenged by the IRS and litigated in U.S. Tax
Court, gender does influence the way judges decide. Also, to whom decisions are made
for is affected by gender. Interestingly enough, number of tax years decided and tenure of
the judge also play significant roles in the judiciary’s rationale of determining reasonable
compensation for a taxpayer employed by a closely held corporation. However, a gender
effect does not appear to exist affecting how CPAs make reasonable compensation
decisions nor does the gender of the taxpayer affect their decision-making process.
Political affiliation, on the other hand, is significant and affects the compensation amount
decided on by a CPA. A republican affiliated CPA tends to render a higher amount of
compensation than a democratic or independent CPA.
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT NUMBER ONE
TITLE OF PROJECT: An Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting Reasonable
Compensation in Closely Held Corporations
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To understand how professionals view reasonable
compensation issues.
PROCEDURE: Your participation in this study will involve reading a scenario and
answering questions designed to assess perceptions of reasonable compensation.
INSTRUMENTS: The survey vignettes consist of a scenario and 32 questions. The
questions are intended to gather basic demographic information and assess the
perceptions of reasonable compensation.
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There are no foreseeable risks concerning
this survey. However, if participants feel uncomfortable at any time, they may withdraw
from the study at any time. The participant understands that Louisiana Tech is not able
to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs of medical treatment should you
be injured as a result of participating in this research.
The following disclosure applies to all participants using online survey tools: This
server may collect information and your IP address indirectly and automatically via
“cookies”.
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: Qualtrics subjects will be compensated as determined
by Qualtrics policy.
I attest that I have read and understood the following description of the study, An
Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting Reasonable Compensation in Closely Held
Corporations, and its purposes and methods. I understand that my participation in this
research is strictly voluntary and my participation or refusal to participate in this study
will not affect my relationship with Louisiana Tech University. Further, I understand
that I may withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any questions without
penalty. Upon completion o f the study, I understand that the results will be freely
available to me upon request. I understand that the results of my survey will be
confidential, accessible only to the principal investigators, myself, or a legally
appointed representative. I have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any of my
rights related to participating in An Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting
Reasonable Compensation in Closely Held Corporations.
Yes _ No _
Please identify your profession.
Educator Government Worker

C PA

M ilitary

O ther__

Do you have any experience with estimating reasonable compensation?
Y es N o __
You are:
M ale Fem ale__
Vignette - ID Did Not Retain Compensation Policy (Includes John and Mary as
taxpayers)

134
John (or Mary), who is a taxpayer, works for a business named International Design
(ID). ID does not have a compensation policy and pays bonuses to employees at the end
of the year once the amount of cash available is determined.
• ID is a closely held company that provides printing, marketing, and advertising
activities
• ID reported gross receipts of $1,583,149.50
• When added with gross rents and gross royalties, the total income for ID was
$1,715,202
• ID paid compensation amounting to a $40,000 salary and a $500,000 bonus to
Mary
• No dividends were paid that year
• Mary was president, secretary, and treasurer
• Mary was responsible for handling all of ID’s managerial duties
• A specific item of time spent with ID was disclosed as 80% of Mary’s time and
evidence was found that Mary spent 20% of the remaining time with ID’s sister
corporation
• No evidence was provided by the corporation identifying a comparison of paid
compensation to other companies providing similar services
• ID has the following information regarding its operations:
• ID paid total wages o f approximately $635,000, of which $540,000 were paid to
Mary and $95,000 were paid to all other employees
• ID is a small company with not very extensive operations
• ID had a return on equity of 42% which more than satisfied a hypothetical
independent investor test
• ID was thinly capitalized
• ID had equipment with a fair market value of $80,332.50
OUTCOME: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon receiving ID’s tax return deems
$150,000 in compensation as reasonable for Mary. Thereby, the IRS disallowed
$390,000 o f Mary’s compensation. Factors commonly considered by the courts are:
• character and condition of the company
• comparison o f salaries paid with the gross income and the net income
• comparison o f salaries with distributions to stockholders
• compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years
• conflict o f interest
• employee’s qualifications
• nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work
• prevailing general economic conditions
• prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns
• salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees
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•
•

scarcity of qualified employees
taxpayer’s role in the company

Based on the facts provided above please answer the following questions.
I have read the above scenario.
Y es N o __
Put yourself in the role of a U.S. Tax Court judge in deciding this case. What dollar
amount, based on the facts and circumstances described above in the scenario, would
you deem as reasonable compensation for the taxpayer? (Provide your dollar amount in
the space below)

What factors were most significant in rendering your decision?

In general, do you see reasonable compensation as a major problem for small businesses
in this country?
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree___Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat A gree___ Agree_Strongly Agree__
In general, do you anticipate litigation of the reasonable compensation issue by the IRS
in the near future will increase, decrease, or remain the same?
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree___Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat A gree____Agree_Strongly Agree__
Explain your answer to the issue of litigation by the IRS in the near future.

Please rank the top five (5) factors from the list below that you deem most significant in
determining reasonable compensation, where 1 represents die most significant, 2
represents the second most significant, through 5 being the least significant of the
5. Factors are arranged in alphabetical order. (Drag and drop your top 5 factors and
then rank them in order from 1 through 5. 1 will be the most significant and 5 will be
the least significant of the 5.)
-Character and condition of the company
-Comparison of employees’ salaries with distributions to stockholders in the company
-Comparison of salaries paid to employee with the company’s gross income and the net
income
-Compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years
-Conflict of interest
-Employee’s qualifications
-Employee’s role in the company
-Nature, extent, and scope of the employee’s work
-Prevailing general economic conditions
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-Prevailing rates o f compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns
-Salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees
-Scarcity o f qualified employees
Please indicate any additional factors you feel are critical that were not included in this
scenario.

If in the scenario, an appraiser (i.e. an expert compensation valuator) was hired by the
taxpayer, such an action would help with the taxpayer’s position regarding reasonable
compensation.
Strongly Disagree Disagree__Somewhat Disagree__ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat A gree__ Agree__Strongly Agree__
This question is an attention filter. In order to continue, please select 'disagree'. Thank
you for your participation.
Strongly Disagree Disagree__Somewhat Disagree__ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree__ Agree__Strongly A gree__
If in the scenario, an appraiser (i.e. an expert compensation valuator) was hired by the
IRS, such an action would help with the IRS’s position regarding reasonable
compensation.
Strongly Disagree_D isagree Somewhat Disagree_____ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree__ Agree__Strongly A gree__
Please select the color yellow below.
Orange B lue Green R ed Yellow

Brown

Purple

If the court ruled in favor of the IRS (i.e. the court upheld the dollar amount submitted
by the IRS), describe your feelings about the decision made by the court in terms of
providing reasonable compensation to the taxpayer by answering all three of the drop
down items below.
If the court ruled in favor of the taxpayer (i.e. the court upheld the dollar amount
submitted by the taxpayer), describe your feelings about the decision made by the court
in terms of providing reasonable compensation to the taxpayer by answering all three of
the drop down items below.
Have you or any of your clients ever been audited by the IRS?
Y es N o __
If you have experience with estimating reasonable compensation, enter the number o f
years in the space below. If no experience, enter "0."

What was the name of the taxpayer in the scenario?
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John M ary Do not Know__
What was the sex of the taxpayer in the scenario?
M ale Female Do not Know__
Identify the dollar amount disallowed by the IRS.
$290,000 __ $390,000 _ $490,000 _ $590,000 _ Do not Know
Did ID have a compensation policy?
Y es N o Do not know
How were bonuses determined? Check only one below.
Bonuses were paid at the end of the year once the amount of cash available was
determined__
Bonuses were paid based on the employee’s individual performance, were the same for
all employees, and originated from a bonus plan voted on and approved by the board of
directors at the beginning of the year__
Do not know __
Was the firm’s method of compensating the taxpayer appropriate based on whether or
not there was a compensation policy and how and when the bonuses were paid to
employees?
Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Somewhat Inappropriate__ Neutral__
Somewhat Appropriate Appropriate Very Appropriate__
This is an attention filter. In order to continue, please select 'appropriate'.
Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Somewhat Inappropriate__ Neutral__
Somewhat Appropriate Appropriate Very Appropriate__
What is your current age in years?

Please indicate your race:
Caucasian African American
Indian O ther__

Hispanic

What is your political affiliation?
Republican Democrat Independent

Asian/Pacific Islander

Other

American

N one__

Indicate your degree o f liberalism/conservatism as it relates to your political beliefs.
Very Liberal Liberal Somewhat Liberal Moderate Somewhat Conservative
Conservative Very Conservative
Do you have one or more daughters?
Y es N o __
Select the answer that best describes your current employment arrangement.
Self-Employed Employed Unemployed Retired__
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How many years of work experience do you have in your field

If currently working, how many years have you been in your current employment
arrangement? If you are retired, enter "R." If you are unemployed, enter "0.

Are you the primary income earner in your family?
Yes _ No
Please indicate your household taxable income level.
$0-$ 18,150 _ $18,151-$45,975 _ $45,976-$73,800 _ $73,801-$111,325 _
$111,326-$ 148,850 _ $ 148,851 -$ 187,850 _ $ 187,851 -$226,850 _ $226,851 $315,975 _ $315,976-$405,100 _ $405,101-$457,600 _ $457,601 and over _
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT NUMBER TWO
TITLE OF PROJECT: An Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting Reasonable
Compensation in Closely Held Corporations
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To understand how professionals view reasonable
compensation issues.
PROCEDURE: Your participation in this study will involve reading a scenario and
answering questions designed to assess perceptions of reasonable compensation.
INSTRUMENTS: The survey vignettes consist of a scenario and 32 questions. The
questions are intended to gather basic demographic information and assess the
perceptions of reasonable compensation.
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: There are no foreseeable risks concerning
this survey. However, if participants feel uncomfortable at any time, they may withdraw
from the study at any time. The participant understands that Louisiana Tech is not able
to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs of medical treatment should you
be injured as a result of participating in this research.
The following disclosure applies to all participants using online survey tools: This
server may collect information and your IP address indirectly and automatically via
“cookies”.
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: Qualtrics subjects will be compensated as determined
by Qualtrics policy.
I attest that I have read and understood the following description of the study, An
Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting Reasonable Compensation in Closely Held
Corporations, and its purposes and methods. I understand that my participation in this
research is strictly voluntary and my participation or refusal to participate in this study
will not affect my relationship with Louisiana Tech University. Further, I understand
that I may withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any questions without
penalty. Upon completion of the study, I understand that the results will be freely
available to me upon request. I understand that the results of my survey will be
confidential, accessible only to the principal investigators, myself, or a legally
appointed representative. I have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any of my
rights related to participating in An Empirical Examination of Factors Affecting
Reasonable Compensation in Closely Held Corporations.
Yes _ No _
Please identify your profession.
Educator Government Worker

C PA

Military

O ther__

Do you have any experience with estimating reasonable compensation?
Yes
No

You are:
Male
Female
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Vignette - ID Did Retain Compensation Policy (Includes John and Mary as taxpayers)
John (or Mary), who is a taxpayer, works for a business named International Design
(ID). ID does have a compensation policy and pays bonuses based on the employee's
individual performance. This policy was the same for all employees and originated
from a bonus plan voted on and approved by the board of directors at the beginning of
the year.
• ID is a closely held company that provides printing, marketing, and advertising
activities
• ID reported gross receipts of $1,583,149.50
• When added with gross rents and gross royalties, the total income for ID was
$1,715,202
• ID paid compensation amounting to a $40,000 salary and a $500,000 bonus to
Mary
• No dividends were paid that year
• Mary was president, secretary, and treasurer
• Mary was responsible for handling all of ID’s managerial duties
• A specific item of time spent with ID was disclosed as 80% of Mary’s time and
evidence was found that Mary spent 20% o f the remaining time with ID’s sister
corporation
• No evidence was provided by the corporation identifying a comparison of paid
compensation to other companies providing similar services
• ID has the following information regarding its operations:
• ID paid total wages of approximately $635,000, of which $540,000 were paid to
Mary and $95,000 were paid to all other employees
• ID is a small company with not very extensive operations
• ID had a return on equity of 42% which more than satisfied a hypothetical
independent investor test
• ID was thinly capitalized
• ID had equipment with a fair market value of $80,332.50
OUTCOME: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon receiving ID’s tax return deems
$150,000 in compensation as reasonable for Mary. Thereby, the IRS disallowed
$390,000 of Mary's compensation. Factors commonly considered by the courts are:
• character and condition o f the company
• comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income
• comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders
• compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years
• conflict of interest
• employee’s qualifications
• nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work
• prevailing general economic conditions
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•
•
•
•

prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns
salary policy o f the taxpayer as to all employees
scarcity of qualified employees
taxpayer’s role in the company

Based on the facts provided above please answer the following questions.
I have read the above scenario.
Y es N o __
Put yourself in the role of a U.S. Tax Court judge in deciding this case. What dollar
amount, based on the facts and circumstances described above in the scenario, would
you deem as reasonable compensation for the taxpayer? (Provide your dollar amount in
the space below)

What factors were most significant in rendering your decision?

In general, do you see reasonable compensation as a major problem for small businesses
in this country?
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree___Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree___ Agree_Strongly Agree__
In general, do you anticipate litigation of the reasonable compensation issue by the IRS
in the near future will increase, decrease, or remain the same?
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree___Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree___ Agree_Strongly A gree__
Explain your answer to the issue of litigation by the IRS in the near future.

Please rank the top five (5) factors from the list below that you deem most significant in
determining reasonable compensation, where 1 represents the most significant, 2
represents the second most significant, through 5 being the least significant of the
5. Factors are arranged in alphabetical order. (Drag and drop your top 5 factors and
then rank them in order from 1 through 5. 1 will be the most significant and 5 will be
the least significant of the 5.)
-Character and condition of the company
-Comparison o f employees’ salaries with distributions to stockholders in the company
-Comparison o f salaries paid to employee with the company’s gross income and the net
income
-Compensation paid to the specific employee in prior years
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-Conflict of interest
-Employee’s qualifications
-Employee’s role in the company
-Nature, extent, and scope of the employee’s work
-Prevailing general economic conditions
-Prevailing rates o f compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns
-Salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees
-Scarcity of qualified employees
Please indicate any additional factors you feel are critical that were not included in this
scenario.

If in the scenario, an appraiser (i.e. an expert compensation valuator) was hired by the
taxpayer, such an action would help with the taxpayer’s position regarding reasonable
compensation.
Strongly Disagree__ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree__ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree__ Agree__Strongly A gree__
This question is an attention filter. In order to continue, please select 'disagree'. Thank
you for your participation.
Strongly Disagree__ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree__ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat A gree_A gree Strongly Agree____
If in the scenario, an appraiser (i.e. an expert compensation valuator) was hired by the
IRS, such an action would help with the IRS’s position regarding reasonable
compensation.
Strongly Disagree__ Disagree_Somewhat Disagree__ Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Agree_A gree Strongly Agree____
Please select the color yellow below.
Orange B lue Green R ed Yellow

Brown

Purple

If the court ruled in favor of the IRS (i.e. the court upheld the dollar amount submitted
by the IRS), describe your feelings about the decision made by the court in terms of
providing reasonable compensation to the taxpayer by answering all three of the drop
down items below.
If the court ruled in favor of the taxpayer (i.e. the court upheld the dollar amount
submitted by the taxpayer), describe your feelings about the decision made by the court
in terms of providing reasonable compensation to the taxpayer by answering all three of
the drop down items below.
Have you or any of your clients ever been audited by the IRS?
Yes
No
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If you have experience with estimating reasonable compensation, enter the number of
years in the space below. If no experience, enter "0."
What was the name o f the taxpayer in the scenario?
John M ary Do not Know__
What was the sex of the taxpayer in the scenario?
M ale Female Do not Know__
Identify the dollar amount disallowed by the IRS.
$290,000 _ $390,000 _ $490,000 _ $590,000 _ Do not Know
Did ID have a compensation policy?
Y es N o Do not know
How were bonuses determined? Check only one below.
Bonuses were paid at the end of the year once the amount of cash available was
determined__
Bonuses were paid based on the employee’s individual performance, were the same for
all employees, and originated from a bonus plan voted on and approved by the board of
directors at the beginning of the year__
Do not know __
Was the firm’s method of compensating the taxpayer appropriate based on whether or
not there was a compensation policy and how and when the bonuses were paid to
employees?
Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Somewhat Inappropriate__Neutral__
Somewhat Appropriate Appropriate Very Appropriate__
This is an attention filter. In order to continue, please select 'appropriate'.
Very Inappropriate Inappropriate Somewhat Inappropriate__Neutral__
Somewhat Appropriate Appropriate Very Appropriate__
What is your current age in years?

Please indicate your race:
Caucasian African American
Indian O ther__

Hispanic

What is your political affiliation?
Republican Democrat Independent

Asian/Pacific Islander

Other

American

N one__

Indicate your degree of liberalism/conservatism as it relates to your political beliefs.
Very Liberal Liberal Somewhat Liberal Moderate Somewhat Conservative
Conservative Very Conservative
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Do you have one or more daughters?
Y es N o __
Select the answer that best describes your current employment arrangement.
Self-Employed Employed Unemployed Retired__
How many years of work experience do you have in your field

If currently working, how many years have you been in your current employment
arrangement? If you are retired, enter "R." If you are unemployed, enter "0.

Are you the primary income earner in your family?
Yes _ No
Please indicate your household taxable income level.
$0-$ 18,150 _ $18,151-$45,975 _ $45,976-$73,800 _ $73,801-$111,325 _
$111,326-$ 148,850 _ $ 148,851 -$ 187,850 _ $ 187,851 -$226,850 _ $226,851 $315,975 _ $315,976-$405,100 _ $405,101-$457,600 _ $457,601 and over _
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LO UISIANA TECH
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Dr. Ted Englebrecht, Dr. Doug Amyx and Mr. Brian Dowis

FROM:

Dr. Stan Napper, Vice President Research & Development

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

March 12,2015

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:
“An Empirical Examination of Gender, Political Affiliation, and Family
Composition Issues Affecting Reasonable Compensation in Closely Held Corporations”
HUC 1283

The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data arc kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
of the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on March 12, 2015 and this
project will need to receive a continuation review by the 1RB i j the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond March 12, 2016. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office of University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct of the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion of the study. If changes occur
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
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Legislative and Administrative Guidance
Used in this Study Cases
Glass Blocks Unlimited v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-180
Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home v. Comm., TC Memo 2013-156
Aries Communications Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-97
K & K Veterinary Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-84
Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2013-10
Allen L. Davis, et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-286
Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-74
Mona L. Herrington, TC Memo 2011-73
Multi-Pak Corporation v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-139
Universal Marketing, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2007-305
Vitamin Village, Inc., TC Memo 2007-272
Ronald Francis, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2007-33
Wechsler & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2006-173
E.J. Harrison & Sons, Inc., TC Memo 2006-133
PK Ventures, Inc. & Subsidiaries, et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2006-36
Miller & Sons Drywall, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2005-114
Beiner, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2004-219
Menard, Inc., et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2004-207
E.J. Harrison and Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2003-239
Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2003-200
Devine Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2003-15
Haflher's Service Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2002-38
B & D Foundations Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2001-262
Damron Auto Parts Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2001-197
Wagner Construction Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2001-160
Metro Leasing and Development Corp., et al. v. Comm., TC Memo 2001-119
Pediatric Surgical Associates P.C. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2001-81
Durham Farms #1, J.V., et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2000-159
Law Offices of Richard Ashare P.C. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-282
Simco Automotive Pump Co., et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-235
Robert L. Boehm, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-227
Eberl's Claim Service Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-211
River City Ranches #4 J.V., et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-209
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Frank Muhich, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-192
Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-155
Herold Marketing Associates Inc., TC Memo 1999-26
C.H. Robinson Inc., et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-430
J. Michael Joly, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-361
Labelgraphics Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-343
Leonard Pipeline Contractors Ltd. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-315
William J. Heitz, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-220
Chen C. Wang, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1998-127
Choate Construction Co. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-495
H&A International Jewelry Ltd. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-467
Alpha Medical Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-464
Max Burton Enterprises Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-421
Tricon Metals & Services Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-360
Sunbelt Clothing Co. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-338
O.S.C. & Associates Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-300
John L. Ginger Masonry Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-251
The Escrow Connection, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-17
Summit Sheet Metal Co. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-563
Leonard Pipeline Contractors, Ltd. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-316
PMT, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-303
Lumber City Corp. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-171
Pulsar Components Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-129
Alondra Industries Ltd., et al v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-32
Guy Schoenecker Inc., et al v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-539
Avis Industrial Corp., et al v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-434
Tool Producers, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-407
Comtec Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-310
Khalil T. Ghosn, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-192
Mad Auto Wrecking, Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-153
Dexsil Corporation v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-135
Rapco Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-128
Donald Palmer Company Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-65
Acme Construction Co. Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-6
Boca Construction Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-5
Comtec Systems Inc. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-4

Universal Manufacturing Company, Inc. and Subs., TC Memo 1994-367
S.A. Manohara, M.D., Inc., TC Memo 1994-333
L & B Pipe & Supply Company, TC Memo 1994-187
Mortex Manufacturing Co., Inc., TC Memo 1994-110
C.T.I. Incorporated, TC Memo 1994-82
Thomas A. Curtis, M.D., Inc., TC Memo 1994-15.
Modemage Developers, Inc., TC Memo 1993-591
William T. Wright, et al., TC Memo 1993-328
Automotive Investment Development, Inc., TC Memo 1993-298
Nelson Brothers, Inc, TC Memo 1992-726
M. & E. Shindler, Inc., TC Memo 1992-290
Friendly Finance, Inc., TC Memo 1991-551
Richlands Medical Association, TC Memo 1990-660
Estate o f Wallace, 95 TC 525
Kermit Fischer Foundation, TC Memo 1990-300
Jerry Lipps, Inc., et al, TC Memo 1990-293
Summit Publishing Company, Inc., TC Memo 1990-288
Hendricks Furniture, Inc., TC Memo 1988-133
Gerrit VanderPol, TC Memo 1987-555.
Contract Reproduction Co., Inc., et al., TC Memo 1987-476
Rosemary Bussiculo, TC Memo 1987-467
Rotolo v. Commissioner, 88 TC 1500
RTS Investment Corporation, TC Memo 1987-98
Sniktaw Petroleum, Inc., TC Memo 1986-554
James H. Rutter, TC Memo 1986-407
William D. Larimore, TC Memo 1986-326
Dewey D. Halligan, et al, TC Memo 1986-243
Bickes-Wilbert Burial Vault Co., Inc., TC Memo 1986-172
Diverse Industries, Inc., TC Memo 1986-84
Webster Tool & Die, Inc., TC Memo 1985-604
Joe J. Adams, TC Memo 1985-297
Owensby & Kritikos, Inc., TC Memo 1985-267
Luther R. Patton, TC Memo 1985-148
H. Kalicak Construction Co., et al., TC Memo 1984-552
Ray Clymer, Jr., TC Memo 1984-203
Estate o f David B. Worster, TC Memo 1984-123
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Woesner Abstract & Title Co., TC Memo 1983-764
Est. of Grace Shantz, et al, TC Memo 1983-743
Harry L. Snyder, et al., TC Memo 1983-692
Demian, Ltd., TC Memo 1983-683
Marcus Wigutow, TC Memo 1983-620
Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Winchester, Inc., TC Memo 1983-611
Georgia Crown Distributing Co., et al, TC Memo 1983-459
Leroy M. Lefkowitz, TC Memo 1983-356
John C. Barrier, TC Memo 1983-258
Geraldine C. Medina, et al, TC Memo 1983-253
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